

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
3 HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS, JUDGE PRESIDING

4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
5)
6 PLAINTIFF,) CASE NO.: 4:11-CR-00187-LAB
7 VS.)
8 JARED LEE LOUGHNER,) TUCSON, ARIZONA
9) MAY 25, 2011
10) 11:00 A.M.
11 DEFENDANT.)
12 _____)

13 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

14 COMPETENCY HEARING

15 APPEARANCES:

16 FOR THE GOVERNMENT:

17 DENNIS K. BURKE, U.S. ATTORNEY
18 BY: BEVERLY ANDERSON, ESQ.
19 MARY SUE FELDMEIER, ESQ.
20 WALLACE KLEINDIENST, ESQ.
21 CHRISTINA CABANILLAS, ESQ.
22 DOMINIC LANZA, ESQ.
23 ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEYS
24 405 W. CONGRESS ST., STE. 4800
25 TUCSON, ARIZONA 85701

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

CLARKE & RICE, APC
BY: JUDY C. CLARKE, ESQ.
1010 SECOND AVENUE, STE. 1800
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

FEDERAL DEFENDERS, INC.
BY: REUBEN CAHN, ESQ.
ELLIS JOHNSTON, ESQ.
220 BROADWAY, STE. 900
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

LAW OFFICE OF MARK FLEMING
BY: MARK F. FLEMING, ESQ.
1350 COLUMBIA STREET, STE. 600
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

1 CONTINUED APPEARANCES:

2 FOR PHOENIX NEWSPAPERS,
3 ET AL.:

STEPTOE & JOHNSON
BY: DAVID BODNEY, ESQ.
COLLIER CENTER
201 EAST WASHINGTON STREET
4 SUITE 1600
5 PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85004-2382

6
7 COURT REPORTER:

EVA OEMICK
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
8 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
9 940 FRONT STREET, STE. 2190
10 SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
11 TEL: (619) 615-3103
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1 TUCSON, ARIZONA - WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 2011 - 11:00 A.M.

2 THE CLERK: CALLING NO. 1 ON THE CALENDAR,
3 11CR00187-LAB, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VERSUS JARED LEE
4 LOUGHNER, ON FOR MOTION HEARING AND COMPETENCY HEARING.

5 IF COUNSEL WOULD PLEASE STATE YOUR APPEARANCES FOR
6 THE RECORD.

7 MS. CLARKE: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.

8 JUDY CLARKE, MARK FLEMING, ELLIS JOHNSTON, AND
9 REUBEN CAHN ON BEHALF OF MR. LOUGHNER, WHO IS PRESENT IN
10 COURT.

11 THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, MS. CLARKE.

12 MR. KLEINDIENST: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.

13 WALLACE KLEINDIENST, DENNIS BURKE, THE U.S. ATTORNEY
14 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, MARY SUE FELDMEIER, BEVERLY
15 ANDERSON, AND DOMINIC LANZA FOR THE GOVERNMENT.

16 THE COURT: GOOD MORNING.

17 GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

18 THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MATTERS ON CALENDAR TODAY.

19 I DON'T SEE MR. BODNEY.

20 OH, THERE HE IS.

21 MR. BODNEY, I'D LIKE TO BEGIN WITH YOUR REQUEST FOR
22 MODIFICATION OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER.

23 DO YOU WANT TO SPEAK TO THAT THIS MORNING?

24 THIS HAS TO DO WITH THE PROTECTIVE ORDER THAT THE
25 COURT ISSUED THAT ESSENTIALLY FORBADE THE DISSEMINATION OF RAW

1 INVESTIGATIVE MATERIAL BY THE PIMA COUNTY SHERIFF. AND YOU
2 ARE ASKING THAT I RECONSIDER THAT AND FOCUS ON SOME OF THAT
3 MATERIAL. I'M NOT INCLINED TO DO THAT, BUT I'M HAPPY TO HEAR
4 FROM YOU BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION.

5 MR. BODNEY: YOUR HONOR, THANK YOU.

6 I'M HERE TODAY ON BEHALF OF *THE WASHINGTON POST*, *THE*
7 *ARIZONA REPUBLIC-PHOENIX* NEWSPAPERS, AND KPNX BROADCASTING
8 COMPANY AS REQUESTED INTERVENORS IN THIS PROCEEDING.

9 AND WE REQUEST MODIFICATION OF THE ORDER, YOUR
10 HONOR, BECAUSE THERE IS CURRENTLY IN PLACE AN ORDER THAT IS
11 IMPERMISSIBLY OVERBROAD. IT IS -- AND THE SOLUTION TO THAT
12 PROBLEM IS RATHER SIMPLE. IT IS THE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER THAT
13 REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENT TO DO WHAT IT PROMISED TO DO BACK ON
14 MARCH 16TH WHEN IT FIRST SOUGHT A MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
15 IN THIS CASE.

16 THE ORDER IS IMPERMISSIBLY OVERBROAD BECAUSE IT
17 ENJOINS THE PIMA COUNTY SHERIFF FROM RELEASING DOCUMENTS THAT
18 ARE PLAINLY SUBJECT TO PUBLIC INSPECTION UNDER THE LAW
19 EITHER --

20 THE COURT: THAT'S THE POINT, THOUGH.

21 WHAT LAW?

22 MR. BODNEY: UNDER --

23 THE COURT: YOU'VE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THIS
24 COURT IS BOUND BY ARIZONA'S PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LAW, AND I DON'T
25 THINK THAT'S CORRECT.

1 MR. BODNEY: YOUR HONOR --

2 THE COURT: I THINK THE STANDARDS ARE VERY
3 DIFFERENT. AND AS I READ THE ARIZONA LAW AND AS I'VE STUDIED
4 IT IN THE PAST EXPOSURES I'VE HAD TO FOR MOTIONS THAT YOU'VE
5 BROUGHT, I DON'T KNOW THAT THERE'S A BROADER PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
6 LAW THAN THE ONE THAT EXISTS IN ARIZONA NOW. IT DOES NOT EVEN
7 ALLOW LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE ORDINARY CASE TO KEEP SECRET
8 INVESTIGATIVE MATERIALS PERTAINING TO ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS.

9 MR. BODNEY: YOUR HONOR, THAT'S, WITH ALL DUE
10 RESPECT, NOT THE ARIZONA LAW. AND WHETHER THE LAW IS THE
11 FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OR THE ARIZONA PUBLIC
12 RECORDS LAW, ARS 39-121, THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW
13 THE DECISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TO REVIEW THE DOCUMENTS IN
14 CAMERA, IF IT CHOOSES, TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY OF THE
15 RECORDS, IF RELEASED, WOULD VIOLATE EITHER THE FAIR TRIAL
16 RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT OR THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF ANY PERSON.

17 THE COURT: ISN'T THERE A PROBLEM HERE,
18 MR. BODNEY? I MEAN, THERE'S A DEFINITE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
19 SEARCH WARRANT MOTIONS --

20 BY THE WAY, YOU SAW THE ORDER I ISSUED CLEARING UP
21 THE DOCKET?

22 MR. BODNEY: YES, YOUR HONOR.

23 THE COURT: THOSE THINGS ARE ALL WITHIN MY CONTROL
24 AND MY PURVIEW BECAUSE THEY'RE JUDICIAL RECORDS. I'VE NEVER
25 SEEN THESE THINGS THAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT. AND THEY HAVE

1 NOT BEEN LODGED WITH THE COURT. THEY HAVEN'T BEEN FILED WITH
2 THE COURT.

3 I THINK THERE'S A BIG DISTINCTION BETWEEN DOCUMENTS
4 HELD BY LAW ENFORCEMENT, OBTAINED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
5 PURPOSES, AND THEN JUDICIAL RECORDS, THINGS THAT ARE LODGED OR
6 FILED WITH THE COURT. OVER THOSE, I AGREE WITH YOU, I HAVE
7 CONTROL.

8 BUT YOU'RE ASKING ME TO REACH OUT AND ESSENTIALLY
9 RECATEGORIZE A BODY OF DOCUMENTS THAT I DON'T EVEN HAVE ACCESS
10 TO, I HAVEN'T SEEN MYSELF.

11 WHY WOULD I HAVE AUTHORITY TO DO THAT?

12 MR. BODNEY: BY THE SAME REASON THAT YOUR HONOR HAD
13 THE AUTHORITY ON MARCH 22ND TO SIGN AN ORDER THAT ENJOINED THE
14 SHERIFF FROM RELEASING PUBLIC RECORDS, SOME OF WHICH THE
15 SHERIFF HAD ALREADY RELEASED, SOME OF WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
16 SAYS THE SHERIFF CAN RELEASE WITHOUT HARM TO ANY INTERESTS.

17 THE PROBLEM TODAY, YOUR HONOR, IS THE ORDER IS
18 IMPERMISSIBLY OVERBROAD. AND HERE'S HOW.

19 THE COURT: I'M PREPARED TO MODIFY IT TO ALLOW THE
20 GOVERNMENT TO GO BACK AND LOOK AT THINGS AND, IF IT CHOOSES,
21 TURN DOCUMENTS THAT DON'T IMPLICATE PRIVACY CONCERNS OR THE
22 DEFENDANT'S FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS OVER.

23 NOW, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU'RE PARTICULARLY
24 INTERESTED IN THOSE THINGS, BUT THE GIST OF THE ORDER THAT I
25 ISSUED WAS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE CASE GETS TRIED IN THE COURT

1 AND NOT IN THE PRESS BEFOREHAND. AND THE RELEASE OF RAW
2 MATERIALS, PHOTOGRAPHS, AND WITNESS ACCOUNTS THAT HERETOFORE
3 HAVE NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC IS GOING TO JEOPARDIZE THOSE
4 INTERESTS. SO THAT'S MY CONCERN.

5 NOW, IF YOU WANT OTHER THINGS AND THE GOVERNMENT IS
6 WILLING TO TURN OVER THOSE OTHER THINGS, THEN I'LL MODIFY THE
7 ORDER TO SAY THIS DOESN'T FORECLOSE THE GOVERNMENT FROM DOING
8 WHAT THEY PROMISED.

9 BUT I THINK WHEN THEY GOT MY ORDER, THEY SAID,
10 "LOOK, THE ORDER CHANGES EVERYTHING. AND WE WERE TRYING TO
11 WORK OUT A COMPROMISE WITH YOU ON THIS, AND THAT LED TO THE
12 NEGOTIATIONS THAT YOU SPEAK OF." BUT ONCE THE COURT RULED ON
13 THIS -- I MEAN, THE REAL DISAGREEMENT YOU HAVE IS WITH THE
14 COURT ORDER, NOT WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

15 MR. BODNEY: WELL, ACTUALLY, YOUR HONOR, IT'S A
16 LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT BECAUSE THE FIRST WE REALLY HEARD OF THIS
17 WAS WHEN THE GOVERNMENT FILED ITS MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER.
18 AND IN THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION, THEY WROTE, AND I QUOTE, "THE
19 UNITED STATES INTENDS TO DILIGENTLY REVIEW THE CONTENTS OF THE
20 PCSO'S FILE IN THE COMING WEEKS TO DETERMINE WHICH MATERIALS
21 MAY BE EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE PROTECTIVE ORDER AND
22 DISCLOSED TO *THE POST*," CLOSE QUOTE.

23 THE GOVERNMENT ALSO SAID "THUS, ONCE THE
24 GOVERNMENT'S REVIEW IS COMPLETE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD
25 PROPOSE SUBMITTING MATERIALS AT ISSUE TO THE COURT FOR

1 IN-CAMERA REVIEW BY APRIL 6."

2 NOW, THE GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS AND THEY UNDERSTOOD
3 BEFORE THE COURT ENTERED THE MARCH 22 ORDER THAT SOME OF THESE
4 RECORDS THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO SEE WHETHER UNDER FOIA OR
5 UNDER THE STATE LAW.

6 AND THE RISK OF THE PROCEEDING AS WE HAVE DONE IS
7 THAT THIS OBSESSION WITH SECRECY NOT ONLY DENIES THE PUBLIC A
8 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO KNOW HOW LAW ENFORCEMENT BEHAVE AND TO
9 EVALUATE THAT BEHAVIOR AS THE LAW REQUIRES, FEDERAL, STATE,
10 COMMON LAW, IT ALSO ENGENDERS A LACK OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
11 POTENTIALLY IN THESE PROCEEDINGS WHEN THERE IS AN ORDER
12 ENJOINING THE RELEASE OF DOCUMENTS THAT THE SHERIFF HAD
13 RELEASED AND WHICH THE GOVERNMENT ADMITS THE SHERIFF COULD
14 RELEASE.

15 SO WE'RE LIVING IN A WORLD TODAY WHERE ONE OF MY
16 CLIENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, OBTAINED SOME OF THESE RECORDS FROM THE
17 SHERIFF'S OFFICE BEFORE THIS ORDER WAS ENTERED. TODAY IF A
18 COLLEGE STUDENT WANTED TO WRITE A REPORT ON THIS CASE, HE
19 WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET THOSE SAME DOCUMENTS FROM THE
20 SHERIFF'S OFFICE.

21 MOREOVER, THE BURDEN UNDER FEDERAL LAW OR STATE LAW
22 RESTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO JUSTIFY THAT THE DISCLOSURE OF
23 THE RECORD WOULD PROBABLY IMPACT THE FAIR TRIAL RIGHT.

24 THE COURT: THAT'S WHERE YOU AND I DIVERGE HERE,
25 BECAUSE YOU SAY IT RESTS WITH THEM TO JUSTIFY WITHHOLDING

1 THESE RECORDS. AND I THINK IT'S THE NATURE OF THE RECORDS
2 THAT'S THE TALE OF THE TAPE HERE, MR. BODNEY. THESE ARE NOT
3 JUDICIAL RECORDS. THEY'RE NOT. THIS IS RAW INFORMATION.

4 THE GOVERNMENT AT THIS POINT EVEN OBJECTS TO YOUR
5 INTERVENING HERE BECAUSE THEY'RE NOT JUDICIAL RECORDS. THEY
6 SAY THERE'S NO CASE THAT THEY CAN FIND WHERE SOMEONE'S BEEN
7 ALLOWED TO INTERVENE, IN FEDERAL COURT AT LEAST, TO SAY, "WE
8 WANT WHAT IS OTHERWISE DISCOVERY MATERIAL IN THE POSSESSION OF
9 THE PARTIES."

10 AND THE FEDERAL LAW, AS YOU KNOW, IS CONTRARY TO
11 THAT PROPOSITION. DISCOVERY IS NOT CONSIDERED A JUDICIAL
12 RECORD, IS NOT SUBJECT TO GENERAL INSPECTION BY PRESS AND
13 PUBLIC. AND THAT'S THE TROUBLE THAT I'M HAVING WITH IT.

14 I'LL SAY AGAIN, I HAVEN'T SEEN THESE THINGS. YOU
15 HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT'S OUT THERE, BECAUSE
16 APPARENTLY SOME HAS ALREADY BEEN GIVEN OVER TO ONE OF YOUR
17 CLIENTS, THAN I DO. THESE AREN'T IN MY CONTROL.

18 WHAT WAS WITHIN MY CONTROL WAS THE ABILITY TO ENTER
19 AN INJUNCTION FORBIDDING PEOPLE, WHO HAD SOME HISTORICAL
20 CONNECTION TO THE INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE, FROM
21 DISSEMINATING INFORMATION THAT MIGHT LIKELY COMPROMISE BOTH
22 SIDES' FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS, AND THAT'S ALL I DID.

23 MR. BODNEY: AND SO, YOUR HONOR, THE SOLUTION IS
24 SIMPLE, AND IT GOES BACK TO REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT TO DO
25 WHAT IT PROMISED TO THE COURT IT WOULD DO AND COOPERATE WITH

1 ITS FELLOW LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, THE PIMA COUNTY SHERIFF'S
2 OFFICE, REVIEW THE DOCUMENTS AS THEY SAID THEY WOULD REVIEW,
3 AND PRODUCE THOSE WHICH THEY KNOW THEY CAN PRODUCE, AND
4 PROVIDE AN INDEX JUSTIFYING THE WITHHOLDING OF THOSE OTHER
5 DOCUMENTS.

6 THE COURT: I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THE FIRST
7 PART OF THE PROPOSAL. IF THEY WANT TO DO THAT, THEN THAT'S A
8 MATTER I'M NOT GOING TO INTERVENE IN.

9 I DO HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE OTHER PART OF THE
10 PROPOSAL BECAUSE, AS I SAID, IT MORPHS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
11 JUDICIAL RECORDS AND DISCOVERY, AND IT PUTS AN ADDED BURDEN ON
12 THE COURT.

13 NOW I'M GOING TO BE LOOKING AT DISCOVERY TO
14 DETERMINE WHETHER THEY'VE MADE NICE DISTINCTIONS ABOUT WHETHER
15 YOU SHOULD OR SHOULDN'T GET PARTICULAR REPORTS, AND THE
16 FEDERAL LAW IS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO THAT. IT SAYS YOU HAVE NO
17 RIGHT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO MATERIALS THAT ARE FAIRLY
18 CLASSIFIED AS DISCOVERY.

19 MR. BODNEY: THE GOVERNMENT HAS CREATED A CATCH-22
20 FOR THE PUBLIC THAT WOULD MAKE JOSEPH HELLER PROUD. THEY HAVE
21 TOLD US THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SEE THESE DOCUMENTS IS UNDER
22 FOIA. AND THEY KNOW THAT WITH YOUR ORDER IN PLACE, THEIR
23 AGENTS REVIEWING THOSE DOCUMENTS WILL SAY, "CAN'T SEE THEM.
24 THERE'S A FEDERAL ORDER IN THIS CASE THAT PROHIBITS THEIR
25 RELEASE. NO IF'S, ANDS, OR BUTS."

1 AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN EVALUATING THE
2 PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY WEIGHTY
3 THAT YOUR HONOR IS THE PERSON IN THE BEST POSITION TO SAY TO
4 THEM, "DO WHAT YOU PROMISED TO DO."

5 THE COURT: HOW IS THIS DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER
6 HIGH-PROFILE CASE THAT THE PUBLIC MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN?

7 LET'S TAKE THIS LITIGATION THAT'S CURRENTLY PENDING
8 AGAINST LEXUS OR TOYOTA. I'M SURE THERE'S A LOT OF DISCOVERY
9 ABOUT BRAKES AND ACCELERATION THAT IS BEING EXCHANGED BETWEEN
10 THE PARTIES THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT OR
11 LODGED WITH THE COURT.

12 IS IT YOUR POSITION THAT IN A CASE LIKE THAT THE
13 COURT SHOULD INTERVENE AND SAY, "GIVE ME THE STUFF BECAUSE I
14 WANT TO LOOK AT IT AND DETERMINE WHETHER IT OUGHT TO BE
15 PUBLICLY DISSEMINATED NOW EVEN THOUGH NONE OF THIS HAS SEEN
16 THE LIGHT OF DAY"? THAT SEEMS PARALLEL TO THIS ISSUE WE'RE
17 DEALING WITH HERE.

18 MR. BODNEY: ALL WE'RE SAYING, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT
19 THE MARCH 22 ORDER LODGED ON THE 23RD NEEDS TO BE MODIFIED TO
20 FIX A PROBLEM OF OVERBREADTH. AND WE UNDERSTAND HOW WE GOT
21 THERE. BUT IF IN THE TOYOTA CASE OR SOME OTHER CIVIL ACTION A
22 FEDERAL JUDGE HAD SAID TO THE TUSCON POLICE DEPARTMENT "THOU
23 SHALT NOT RELEASE ANY PUBLIC RECORDS. NO IFs, ANDs, OR BUTs,"
24 I THINK THERE WOULD BE AN ABILITY TO RECALIBRATE THE ORDER.

25 RULE 57.2, WHICH THEY CITE, BEGINS WITH TWO WORDS

1 THAT I THINK ARE IMPORTANT: AND ONE OF THEM IS "GUIDELINE,"
2 AND THE OTHER IS "BALANCE." IT'S ALL ABOUT BALANCE.

3 AND WE RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THAT THE BALANCE IS OUT
4 OF WHACK BECAUSE THERE'S NOW AN ORDER THAT DOES NOT ALLOW THE
5 PUBLIC ANY OVERTURE INTO -- ANY APERTURE, RATHER, INTO THE
6 RECORDS IN A CASE WHERE THE INVESTIGATION IS OVER AND WHERE
7 YOUR HONOR KNOWS BETTER THAN I HOW LONG IT WILL BE BEFORE THE
8 PUBLIC WILL EVER BE ABLE TO SEE THEM.

9 THE COURT: BUT THE CASE HASN'T BEEN TRIED YET.
10 THAT'S THE PROBLEM THAT I HAVE WITH IT. IF WE RELEASE ALL
11 THIS RAW MATERIAL, IT FORECLOSES THE POINT OF THE TRIAL. AND
12 SOME OF IT MAY CHANGE. WITNESSES MAY BE SUBJECT TO HARASSMENT
13 OR TO EVEN INTERVIEWS BY THE PRESS AT THIS POINT BEFORE
14 THEY'RE ALLOWED TO TESTIFY AND BE CROSS-EXAMINED IN A COURT OF
15 LAW.

16 NONE OF THAT, I THINK, IS GOOD FOR THE FINAL OUTCOME
17 HERE. YOU SPOKE ABOUT CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME. I THINK WE
18 OUGHT TO CLEAVE TO THE WAY TRIALS ARE DONE, WHICH IS THEY GET
19 TRIED IN COURT ON THE BASIS OF TESTED EVIDENCE, NOT IN A
20 NEWSPAPER BEFOREHAND.

21 MR. BODNEY: AND I DON'T DISAGREE, BUT I WOULD JUST
22 ADD ONE LITTLE WORD TO THE MIX, AND THAT'S "REDACTION." THE
23 GOVERNMENT DOES IT ALL THE TIME, AND THEY'VE OFFERED TO DO IT
24 HERE.

25 IF THERE ARE NAMES OF PERSONS THAT NEED TO BE

1 REDACTED, YOUR HONOR CAN, WITH THE SAME PEN THAT ENJOINED PCSO
2 FROM PRODUCING ANYTHING, SAY TO THEM, "REDACT THAT WHICH IS
3 PRIVATE. REDACT THAT WHICH WOULD VIOLATE SOMEONE'S FAIR TRIAL
4 RIGHTS. BUT LET'S NOT DEPRIVE THE PUBLIC OF ANY OPENING
5 INTO" --

6 THE COURT: YOU HAVE ANOTHER STEP BEHIND. I THINK
7 YOU WANT ME TO LOOK OVER THEIR SHOULDER AND SAY, "THAT
8 REDACTION IS OKAY. THAT ONE IS NOT. THAT ONE GOES TOO FAR";
9 RIGHT? THEY'RE NOT MAKING ANY REDACTIONS. YOU'RE JUST
10 HANDING OVER WHAT'S LEFT.

11 MR. BODNEY: WELL, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, YOUR
12 HONOR, WE'RE BEHIND THE 8 BALL. AND WE TRUST YOUR HONOR, AND
13 WE MUST TRUST THE GOVERNMENT.

14 UNFORTUNATELY, THE GOVERNMENT PROMISED ONE THING AND
15 DID SOMETHING VERY DIFFERENT HERE, WHICH IS NOT TO DO WHAT IT
16 PROMISED TO DO. SO LET THEM PRODUCE THAT WHICH THEY KNOW THEY
17 CAN PRODUCE. THAT WILL INSTILL TRUST AND WON'T HARM ANYTHING.

18 THE COURT: LET'S SEE WHAT THEIR POSITION IS. I'LL
19 LET YOU HAVE THE FINAL WORD AFTER I HEAR FROM MR. KLEINDIENST
20 OR WHOMEVER SPEAKS FOR THE GOVERNMENT ON THIS.

21 MR. BODNEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

22 MR. KLEINDIENST: MR. LANZA WILL ARGUE THE CASE FOR
23 THE GOVERNMENT, YOUR HONOR.

24 MR. LANZA: GOOD MORNING. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

25 THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS THE COURT HAD THE RIGHT

1 WHEN IT ISSUED A PROTECTIVE ORDER HERE THAT NO MODIFICATION IS
2 NECESSARY. THE CRUX OF THIS CASE IS WHAT THE PRESS IS
3 ESSENTIALLY SEEKING ACCESS TO IS UNFILED DISCOVERY IN A
4 FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. THE COURT GOT IT DEAD RIGHT IN
5 ITS ORDER. THAT'S NOT THE TYPE OF THING THAT THE PRESS
6 TRADITIONALLY HAS ACCESS TO.

7 AT A MINIMUM, THE WAY THAT THE PRESS SEEKS ACCESS TO
8 THAT TYPE OF MATERIAL ISN'T INTERVENING IN THE UNDERLYING
9 CRIMINAL CASE AND ASKING THE JUDGE TO GO PAGE BY PAGE THROUGH
10 WHAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY THINK IS SENSITIVE OR NOT SENSITIVE
11 AND SECOND-GUESS THOSE DETERMINATIONS.

12 AND SO OUR POSITION HERE IS THAT THIS IS THE WRONG
13 PROCESS TO THE EXTENT THE PRESS BELIEVES IT HAS A LEGITIMATE
14 RIGHT TO THESE RECORDS. IF THE PRESS WANTS ACCESS TO THESE
15 MATERIALS, THEY SHOULD FILE A FOIA REQUEST. THAT IS A PROCESS
16 THAT HAS WELL-ESTABLISHED STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHAT'S
17 SENSITIVE AND WHAT ISN'T AND HAS A ROBUST JUDICIAL REVIEW
18 PROCESS THAT IF THEY WERE ULTIMATELY DISSATISFIED WITH THE
19 AGENCY DETERMINATION OF WHAT'S SENSITIVE OR WHAT ISN'T, THEY
20 COULD FILE A NEW CIVIL LAWSUIT IN FEDERAL COURT TO CHALLENGE
21 THAT DETERMINATION.

22 THE COURT: MR. BODNEY SAYS THAT YOU'RE
23 MOUSETRAPPING HIM BY PUTTING HIM IN THAT POSITION BECAUSE WITH
24 THE COURT'S PROTECTIVE ORDER IN EFFECT, THE FOIA REVIEWERS ARE
25 GOING TO SAY, "YOU DON'T GET ANYTHING."

1 MR. LANZA: AND I DISAGREE WITH THAT. THEY COULD
2 USE SOME COLORFUL LANGUAGE IN THEIR BRIEFS AND JOSEPH HELLER
3 REFERENCES AND KAFKA REFERENCES.

4 THE COURT'S ORDER SIMPLY SAYS, "TO THE EXTENT YOU'RE
5 TRYING TO END-RUN FOIA AND GO TO THE PIMA COUNTY SHERIFF AND
6 TRY TO SEEK THESE RECORDS, THAT'S A NONSTARTER HERE." THIS IS
7 A FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION THAT INVOLVES A CRIME, AS WE'VE
8 SET FORTH, AND INVOLVES UNIQUELY STRONG FEDERAL INTERESTS.

9 THE COURT: DO THEY HAVE AN OPTION OF FILING A WRIT
10 OF MANDAMUS WITH THE NINTH CIRCUIT AT THIS POINT? THAT'S WHAT
11 HAPPENED IN ASSOCIATED PRESS VERSUS U.S. DISTRICT COURT, 705
12 F. 2D 1143. IS THAT AN OPTION?

13 MR. LANZA: I THINK PROCEDURALLY THAT WOULD BE MORE
14 APPROPRIATE THAN TRYING TO INTERVENE IN THIS CASE. OUR
15 RESEARCH HAS SAID -- WE HAVEN'T FOUND A CASE EXCEPT FOR THIS
16 PATKAR CASE WHERE IT APPARENTLY WASN'T REALLY CONSIDERED BY
17 THE PARTIES AND CONCEDED THAT THE PRESS COULD INTERVENE TO
18 CHALLENGE A PROTECTIVE ORDER IN A FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE. I'M
19 NOT SURE ON THE MERITS THEY WOULD SUCCEED IN A MANDAMUS
20 PROCEEDING. BUT AT THE MINIMUM, THAT IS PROCEDURALLY MORE
21 PROPER THAN TRYING TO HEAR ME IN HERE.

22 I THOUGHT IT WAS TELLING IN THEIR REPLY BRIEF THEY
23 CITED A CASE CALLED DAVIS WHERE THE DAVIS COURT SAID, "WELL,
24 THEY MOVED TO INTERVENE HERE. REALLY, THE REMEDY FOR THE
25 PRESS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS TO SEEK MANDAMUS OR TO FILE A

1 NEW CIVIL ACTION, BUT THAT'S FORM OVER SUBSTANCE. SO CLOSE
2 ENOUGH. WE'LL LET THEM INTERVENE."

3 I UNDERSTAND PERHAPS WHY THE COURT REACHED THE
4 CONCLUSION IN THAT CASE. BUT RESPECTFULLY, FEDERAL COURTS ARE
5 TYPICALLY PRETTY NARROW AND CAREFUL ABOUT CONSTRUING WHAT
6 THEIR JURISDICTION IS AND WHO CAN BE IN FRONT OF THEM. SO
7 FORM IS IMPORTANT WHEN IT COMES TO DETERMINING FEDERAL
8 JURISDICTION AND FEDERAL STANDING.

9 THE COURT: YOUR POSITION IS THEY DON'T EVEN HAVE A
10 RIGHT TO INTERVENE ON THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THE MATERIALS ARE
11 FAIRLY CHARACTERIZED AS DISCOVERY?

12 MR. LANZA: CORRECT. OUR POSITION IS THAT IT IS
13 UNDISPUTED THAT FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW AND THE FEDERAL RULES DO
14 NOT ALLOW THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE. WE
15 ACKNOWLEDGE AND WE SET FORTH IN OUR BRIEF THAT THERE IS THIS
16 LINE OF CASE LAW THAT HAS RECOGNIZED THIS IMPLICIT RIGHT OF
17 INTERVENTION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE PRESS IS SEEKING
18 ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS.

19 BECAUSE COURT RECORDS, AS THE COURT HAS RECOGNIZED,
20 ARE PRESUMPTIVELY OPEN. AND IF THERE WAS A PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT
21 OF ACCESS YET THERE WERE NO PROCEDURAL VEHICLE FOR VINDICATING
22 IT, A RIGHT TO THAT REMEDY IS MEANINGLESS. THAT'S THE WHOLE
23 POINT HERE. THESE AREN'T JUDICIAL RECORDS, AND THEY'RE
24 ESSENTIALLY TRYING TO COME INTO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
25 AND ASK THE TRIAL JUDGE TO DO THIS VERY GRANULAR WEIGHING OF

1 WHAT'S SENSITIVE AND WHAT ISN'T.

2 THE COURT: MR. BODNEY SAYS, AS I UNDERSTAND THE
3 ARGUMENT BECAUSE I ASKED HIM ABOUT THAT, TOO -- HIS POSITION
4 SEEMS TO BE THAT MAYBE THE CHARACTER OF THE RECORDS MORPHED
5 WHEN I ISSUED THE PROTECTIVE ORDER; THAT ALL OF A SUDDEN, THEY
6 CAME UNDER FEDERAL COURT AUTHORITY BECAUSE I TOLD THE SHERIFF,
7 "DON'T RELEASE THESE THINGS."

8 MR. LANZA: THAT'S INCORRECT, YOUR HONOR. WE
9 DISAGREE WITH THAT. I MAY BE A CYNIC. I THINK IF THE COURT
10 WERE TO GO DOWN THE PATH OF MODIFYING THE PROTECTIVE ORDER
11 UNDER WHAT THEY CLAIM IS A VERY SIMPLE NARROW RELIEF OF JUST
12 ALLOWING US TO RELEASE WHAT WE BELIEVE IS SENSITIVE -- AGAIN,
13 I MAY BE CYNICAL -- I BELIEVE OUR FRIENDS IN THE PRESS MAY
14 HAVE A DIFFERENT VIEW OF WHAT'S SENSITIVE AND WHAT ISN'T.

15 THE COURT: I THINK THAT'S INEVITABLE.

16 BUT WHAT ABOUT HIS OTHER PROPOSAL? YOU SAID YOU'D
17 GIVE THEM SOME STUFF. APPARENTLY, THAT WAS BASED ON A REVIEW
18 AND AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE ARE SOME THINGS THAT, IN YOUR
19 JUDGMENT, WON'T AFFECT PRIVACY RIGHTS, WON'T AFFECT FAIR TRIAL
20 RIGHTS. ARE YOU WILLING TO REINSTATE THAT COMMITMENT, GO BACK
21 AND LOOK AT THESE THINGS AND TURN OVER THINGS THAT DON'T
22 JEOPARDIZE EITHER MR. LOUGHNER'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL OR THE
23 GOVERNMENT'S?

24 MR. LANZA: I THINK THAT'S ONE ALTERNATIVE. WE
25 DON'T BELIEVE THE COURT SHOULD DO THAT. THE COURT COULD DO

1 THAT. AND I JUST WANT -- I THINK IT'S A MATTER OF PROCESS.
2 IF WE GO DOWN THAT ROUTE, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE PRESS IS
3 GOING TO BE DISSATISFIED WITH OUR SENSITIVITY DETERMINATIONS
4 AND COME BACK IN HERE, AND WE'RE GOING TO HAVE ROUNDS AND
5 ROUNDS OF SERIAL LITIGATION WHERE YOU ULTIMATELY ARE GOING TO
6 BE ASKED DOWN TO EVERY HOOK, LINE, AND SINKER OF EVERY LAST
7 REDACTION WHAT'S APPROPRIATE.

8 THE COURT: THAT'S SORT OF WHAT I AM AFRAID OF.

9 MR. LANZA: I'D SUBMIT THAT THE REASON WHY THERE'S
10 NO RIGHT OF INTERVENTION UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS BECAUSE
11 THERE'S A TOTALLY SEPARATE PROCESS OTHER THAN JETTISONING INTO
12 THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCESS FOR DOING THAT DETERMINATION, AND
13 IT'S FOIA.

14 THEY FILE A REQUEST TO THE FEDERAL AGENCY. WE
15 REVIEW IT. IF THEY'RE DISSATISFIED, IT GOES TO A JUDGE WHO
16 CAN APPLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL STANDARDS, FOIA STANDARDS,
17 RATHER THAN THE AD HOC PROCESS WE'D HAVE HERE FOR MAKING THESE
18 DETERMINATIONS.

19 SO WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE NOTION THAT WE'RE SOMEHOW
20 CREATING A CATCH-22. THIS IS A PROCESS ISSUE. THE COURT GOT
21 IT RIGHT IN ITS INITIAL ORDER. AND WE THINK THE CORRECT WAY
22 AND THE REASONABLE WAY AND THE EFFICIENT WAY IS FOR THEM TO
23 FILE A FOIA REQUEST.

24 IT'S TELLING THAT THEY HAVEN'T DONE THAT. THE COURT
25 RECOGNIZED THAT IN ITS PROTECTIVE ORDER. IT'S TELLING THAT

1 THEY KEEP TRYING TO USE THIS END-RUN TO PIMA COUNTY INSTEAD OF
2 JUST FILING A REQUEST WITH OUR OFFICE. YOU CAN PERHAPS READ
3 INTO IT WHATEVER YOU WANT ABOUT THEIR OWN VIEW OF THE MERITS
4 OF FOIA ENTITLEMENT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT
5 PROCEDURALLY, THAT'S OUR POSITION.

6 THE COURT: THANK YOU.

7 MR. BODNEY, I'LL HEAR FROM YOU IN REBUTTAL.

8 MR. BODNEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

9 MOST OF THE WORDS WE'VE HEARD SO FAR HAVE RELATED TO
10 THE RIGHT OF MY CLIENTS EVEN TO APPEAR AND SEEK INTERVENTION.
11 AND LET ME ADDRESS EACH OF THOSE POINTS VERY BRIEFLY, IF I
12 MAY.

13 THE FIRST POINT MADE AND THE LAST POINT RETURNED TO
14 WAS FILE A FOIA REQUEST. THE VERY LAW REVIEW ARTICLE CITED BY
15 THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS BRIEF, THE ONE BY JANICE TORAN FROM THE
16 *GEORGIA LAW REVIEW* SAYS THAT THIS WOULD BE, AT BEST, A
17 CHARADE, AND THAT'S BECAUSE SOME OTHER FEDERAL COURT THAT GETS
18 A FOIA LAWSUIT IS GOING TO SAY, "WELL, YOU NOW ESSENTIALLY
19 ATTEMPT EXCEPTION UNDER FOIA, BUT THERE'S A SEALING ORDER WITH
20 NO EXCEPTIONS." SO THAT'S NOT AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY.

21 THE SECOND, JUST TO CLEAR THE AIR, THIS IS ANYTHING
22 BUT AN END-RUN. AS THE COURT KNOWS FROM OUR EXHIBITS, THESE
23 REQUESTS WERE MADE IN EARLY JANUARY, LATE JANUARY. THEY WERE
24 ALL MADE BEFORE THE PUBLIC KNEW WHETHER THE COURT WOULD
25 EXERCISE FEDERAL JURISDICTION, WHETHER THERE WOULD BE

1 FOUR COUNTS OR 400 COUNTS. WHO KNEW? JUST LIKE THE SEARCH
2 WARRANTS WERE SOUGHT FROM THE STATE COURT JUDGE.

3 SO WE HAVEN'T BEEN ANGLING FOR STATE COURT PROCESS.
4 WE HAVE BEEN VERY CONFIDENT IN YOUR HONOR'S ABILITY TO DECIDE
5 THESE ISSUES FAIRLY, WHICH IS WHAT IT'S ALL ABOUT, AND JUST TO
6 DO IT WITH BALANCE.

7 THIRD, ON INTERVENTION, I WOULD SUGGEST THE COURT
8 LOOK AT ONE OF THE MORE RECENT CIRCUIT COURT CASES, THE
9 BLAGOJEVICH CASE FROM THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, WHERE THE COURT
10 SAYS THE INTERVENTION SHOULD BE ALLOWED WHENEVER THE POTENTIAL
11 INTERVENOR HAS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME AND CANNOT
12 PREVENT THAT INTEREST WITHOUT IT BECOMING A PARTY.

13 THE COURT: I'M PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THE MEDIA
14 OUTLET'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THIS CASE. FRANKLY, I READ THE
15 CASES AS PERTAINING JUST TO JUDICIAL RECORDS. BUT BECAUSE THE
16 RESOLUTION OF THAT QUESTION ALSO INFORMS WHETHER YOU HAVE A
17 RIGHT TO INTERVENE, I WOULD HAVE TO RESOLVE THE SUBSTANTIVE
18 QUESTION WITHOUT INPUT FROM YOU, AND I DON'T WANT TO DO THAT.
19 SO I'M SORT OF FORCED INTO IT HERE.

20 BUT I'VE GOT TO TELL YOU, MR. BODNEY, ALL OF THE
21 CASES THAT I'VE LOOKED AT, EVEN BLAGOJEVICH, WHERE THE ISSUE
22 IS THE ANONYMOUS IMPANELING OF JURORS, WHAT WAS CLEAR THERE IS
23 AT LEAST THE COURT KNOWS WHO THOSE PEOPLE ARE. THE COURT HAS
24 SOME RECORD OF WHAT ACTUAL IDENTITIES ARE. WHILE IT MAY
25 DENOMINATE THEM AS JURORS 1 THROUGH 12 OR 1 THROUGH 14, THERE

1 IS A COURT RECORD THAT AT SOME POINT SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE
2 AS TO AT LEAST WHO THOSE FOLKS ARE.

3 THAT'S NOT THE SITUATION HERE. I DON'T HAVE THIS
4 STUFF. I'VE NEVER HAD IT. AT SOME POINT, I SUPPOSE, IF IT
5 INFORMS SOME SUBSTANTIVE MOTION, MAYBE A REPORT OR SOMETHING
6 MAY BE LODGED WITH ME. BUT TYPICALLY, IN A CRIMINAL OR CIVIL
7 CASE, FOR THAT MATTER, I NEVER SEE THE UNDERLYING STUFF. IT
8 COMES UP FROM TIME TO TIME, AS YOU KNOW AS A TRIAL LAWYER,
9 WHEN SOMEONE GETS IMPEACHED. BUT OTHERWISE, THERE'S NOT A
10 DISCOVERY DUMP ON THE COURT.

11 MR. BODNEY: RIGHT.

12 THE COURT: THAT'S VERY DIFFERENT, I THINK, WITH
13 BLAGOJEVICH AND THE OTHER CASES THAT YOU CITE WHERE THERE ARE
14 CLEARLY JUDICIAL RECORDS INVOLVED. THIS IS NOT -- THIS IS
15 CLEARLY THE OTHER WAY. IT'S DISCOVERY STUFF.

16 MR. BODNEY: EXCEPT IT'S NOT A REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
17 STUFF. WE DON'T KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER THE SAME MATERIALS
18 WE'VE REQUESTED ARE MATERIALS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS PRODUCED
19 TO THE DEFENDANT OR NOT.

20 THE COURT: HOW WOULD THAT ENTITLE YOU TO THIS?
21 THEY HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER THE RULES TO GIVE THE DEFENSE
22 MATERIALS THAT PERTAIN TO THE CASE, BUT THAT DOESN'T CONVERT
23 THOSE TO JUDICIAL RECORDS.

24 ONCE AGAIN, I NEVER SEE THOSE. THAT DISCOVERY TAKES
25 PLACE QUITE INDEPENDENT OF THE COURT RECEIVING ANY OF THE

1 INFORMATION. I MAY ISSUE ORDERS RESPECTING DISCOVERY AND HOW
2 THE MATERIALS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED, BUT I DON'T GET IT. IT'S
3 NOT LODGED WITH THE COURT TYPICALLY.

4 MR. BODNEY: YOUR HONOR, JUST -- NOT TO BELABOR THE
5 POINT, BUT IT ULTIMATELY COMES DOWN TO THIS: YOUR HONOR HAS,
6 WHAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS ARGUED, THE INHERENT POWER TO BALANCE
7 THESE ISSUES. AND THE CURRENT ORDER IS IMBALANCED FROM OUR
8 PERSPECTIVE, AND IT CAN BE RIGHTED BY TELLING THE GOVERNMENT
9 TO DO WHAT IT PROMISED TO DO.

10 WE'RE RELYING NOT ONLY ON A 1ST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
11 ACCESS, BUT ALSO A COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS AND A STATUTORY
12 RIGHT OF ACCESS THAT THE COURT CAN WEIGH. WE ARE, IN ALL
13 CANDOR, IN ONE OF THOSE INTERSTICES OF THE LAW THAT IS VERY
14 UNIQUE. IT PUTS THIS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATUTE UNDER
15 WHICH THE UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS MOVE FORWARD IN RARIFIED
16 SPACE IN TERMS OF PRECEDENT.

17 AND IN TERMS OF THE WORRY THAT WE'RE GOING TO BE
18 BACK HERE AND REQUIRING YOUR HONOR TO SERVE AS A SPECIAL
19 MASTER, IN EFFECT, OVER A BUNCH OF DOCUMENTS YOU HAVEN'T SEEN,
20 ALLOW ME TO ALLAY THAT CONCERN. THIS IS EXPENSIVE STUFF. AND
21 THE ABILITY OF A PARTY TO COME INTO FEDERAL COURT AND SAY, NOT
22 SIMPLY AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE, THAT
23 WE NEED TO HAVE NOT ONLY THE REALITY, BUT THE APPEARANCE OF
24 OPENNESS.

25 THE COURT: YOU DIDN'T OBJECT TO ANY OF THE

1 REDACTIONS THAT I ORDERED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT MATERIAL;
2 RIGHT?

3 MR. BODNEY: DID NOT. DID NOT.

4 THE COURT: ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE ORDER ON THE
5 DOCKET?

6 MR. BODNEY: WE ARE.

7 YOUR HONOR, PART OF THAT COMES DOWN TO THERE'S AN
8 AWFUL LOT OF TRUST INVOLVED. AND SO WE UNDERSTAND THAT THINGS
9 NEED TO BE BALANCED. THEY JUST NEED TO BE RECALIBRATED IN A
10 WAY THAT PUTS NO GREATER BURDEN ON THEM THAN THEY OFFERED TO
11 UNDERTAKE ON DAY ONE.

12 SO WITH THOSE ISSUES IN MIND, YOUR HONOR, WE HOPE
13 THAT THE ORDER WILL BE MODIFIED.

14 THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. BODNEY.

15 MS. CLARKE, I DIDN'T MEAN TO IGNORE YOU.

16 DO YOU HAVE ANY POSITION ON THIS BEYOND THE ONE THAT
17 YOU'VE TAKEN?

18 MS. CLARKE: NO, YOUR HONOR.

19 THE COURT: HERE IS THE COURT'S CONCLUSION ON THIS.

20 AND A WRITTEN ORDER, MR. BODNEY, WILL GO OUT LATER
21 TODAY TO FACILITATE ANY REVIEW THAT YOU MAY WANT TO TAKE FROM
22 THIS ORDER.

23 LET ME BEGIN, MR. BODNEY, BY REPEATING SOMETHING I
24 THINK I TOLD YOU WHEN I FIRST MET YOU IN INFORMAL
25 CONVERSATION. I'M SENSITIVE TO THE INTERESTS THAT YOU

1 MENTIONED. I'M NOT OBLIVIOUS TO THOSE. I UNDERSTAND THAT
2 THIS IS A CASE THAT HAS A LOT OF PUBLIC ATTENTION AND PEOPLE
3 DON'T WANT TO BE KEPT IN THE DARK, AND I GET THAT. AND I
4 UNDERSTAND THAT TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THAT THE COMMUNITY
5 OUGHT TO BE INFORMED ABOUT THIS CASE. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT
6 EVENT THAT HAPPENED.

7 I THINK I MENTIONED TO YOU I WENT THROUGH A
8 PRELIMINARY HEARING ONCE AS A YOUNG LAWYER 30 YEARS AGO WHERE
9 WE HAD THREE MONTHS IN A LOCKED COURTROOM, AND NOBODY KNEW
10 WHAT WAS GOING ON. I DIDN'T LIKE IT THEN. AND WE'RE SHAPED
11 BY OUR EXPERIENCES, AND THAT CERTAINLY HAD AN EFFECT ON MY
12 VIEW OF HOW CRIMINAL CASES OUGHT TO GO. SO I HAVE THOSE
13 CONCERNS IN MIND. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT.

14 *THE WASHINGTON POST* REQUESTED FROM THE PIMA COUNTY
15 SHERIFF RELEASE OF ALL RECORDS RELATING TO THE INVESTIGATION
16 OF THE JANUARY 8TH, 2011 SHOOTING IN TUCSON AND THE APPARENT
17 REFUSAL OF THE SHERIFF TO DENY THAT REQUEST.

18 WHEN I WAS INFORMED OF THAT, I WAS ASKED TO ENTER A
19 PROTECTIVE ORDER -- AND I DID SO ON MARCH 23RD -- THAT
20 DIRECTED THE SHERIFF NOT TO RELEASE INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS,
21 FILES, OR MATERIALS RELATING TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE.

22 THE MEDIA OUTLETS, *WASHINGTON POST* NOW JOINED BY
23 PHOENIX NEWSPAPERS ASSOCIATION -- INCORPORATED AND KPNX
24 BROADCASTING, ASKED ME TO MODIFY THAT ORDER. THEY'D TAKEN THE
25 POSITION THAT THE ORDER IS OVERBROAD AND THAT UNDER ARIZONA'S

1 OWN PUBLIC RECORDS LAW THE SHERIFF'S INVESTIGATION MATERIALS
2 SHOULD BE OPEN TO INSPECTION BY THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC.

3 AS A FALLBACK POSITION, THE NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE
4 REQUESTED THAT REDACTED COPIES OF THOSE MATERIALS BE MADE
5 AVAILABLE HOLDING BACK ONLY THE PARTS THAT PERTAIN TO PRIVACY
6 AND CONFIDENTIALITY CONCERNS.

7 THE NEWS ORGANIZATIONS' REQUEST PRESENTS
8 TWO QUESTIONS: THE FIRST IS WHETHER THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO
9 BEGIN WITH TO INTERVENE IN THIS CASE AND SEEK THE MODIFICATION
10 OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. ASSUMING THEY DO -- AND THE
11 GOVERNMENT CONTESTS THAT YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO INTERVENE -- THEN
12 THE SECOND QUESTION IS WHETHER ANY MODIFICATION OF THE
13 EXISTING PROTECTIVE ORDER IS WARRANTED.

14 THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THE PRESS HAS
15 ATTEMPTED TO INTERVENE IN A CASE. IN PARTICULAR, PNI AND KPNX
16 AREN'T STRANGERS TO THIS COURT. THEY SOUGHT TO INTERVENE IN
17 JANUARY IN THE STATE CASE, AS MR. BODNEY HAS MENTIONED. THAT
18 ACTION, ONCE IT WAS FILED, WAS REMOVED TO THIS COURT. I
19 ULTIMATELY RULED ON THAT.

20 THE REQUEST INITIALLY WAS THAT SEARCH WARRANT
21 MATERIAL BE RELEASED BECAUSE UNDER ARIZONA LAW AND THE LAW IN
22 OTHER JURISDICTIONS, SEARCH WARRANTS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
23 ONCE THEY'VE BEEN SERVED AND ONCE THE INVESTIGATION HAS ENDED
24 AND FINAL CHARGES ARE BROUGHT.

25 I RESOLVED THAT MATTER ON THE MERITS FIRST AGAINST

1 THE INTERVENORS BECAUSE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF *TIMES-MIRROR*,
2 THEY WEREN'T ENTITLED TO THEM, THE INVESTIGATION WAS ONGOING,
3 AND THE GOVERNMENT PREDICTED THAT THERE WOULD BE ADDITIONAL
4 CHARGES.

5 LATER AFTER THOSE DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRED, THE
6 INVESTIGATION WAS FINISHED AND CHARGES WERE FILED, THE COURT
7 RECONSIDERED THE MATTER AND RULED IN FAVOR OF THE INTERVENORS
8 AND ULTIMATELY RELEASED SEARCH WARRANT MATERIAL. STILL LATER,
9 THE COURT ALLOWED PNI TO INTERVENE AND SEEK AN ACCOUNTING OF
10 SEALED ENTRIES IN THE CASE DOCKET.

11 I THINK I'VE EXPLAINED TO YOU, MR. BODNEY, THAT THE
12 PROCEDURE FOLLOWED HERE IN THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, AT LEAST
13 IN THE TUCSON DIVISION, IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT I WAS USED TO.
14 THE LAWYERS LODGE THINGS WITH A REQUEST FOR SEAL, AND THEY'RE
15 AUTOMATICALLY SEALED. AND I, THROUGH AN ORDER, HAD -- I DON'T
16 WANT TO SAY PUT A STOP TO THAT PRACTICE, BUT WE'RE DOING IT
17 DIFFERENTLY IN THIS CASE. THE REQUEST TO SEAL MUST COME TO ME
18 BEFORE ANYTHING IS SEALED IN THE DOCKET.

19 AND THEN JUST AS OF YESTERDAY OR THE DAY BEFORE, I
20 WENT THROUGH WITH THE LAW CLERK, AND WE HAVE CLEANED UP THE
21 DOCKET AND ACCOUNTED FOR ALL GAPS AND UNEXPLAINED SEALING OF
22 PRIOR PROCEEDINGS. SOME REMAIN SEALED. BUT THE REASONS FOR
23 SEALING, IN GENERIC TERMS, ARE IDENTIFIED.

24 BUT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT OBJECTS TO
25 THE INTERVENTION. ITS BASIC ARGUMENT IS INTERVENTION IS ONLY

1 WARRANTED, AS WITH THE SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE DOCKET ENTRIES,
2 WHEN THE PRESS IS SEEKING ACCESS TO MATERIALS THAT ARE FAIRLY
3 CHARACTERIZED AS JUDICIAL RECORDS. AS TO THAT CATEGORY, AS
4 MR. BODNEY CORRECTLY POINTS OUT, THERE'S A PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT
5 OF ACCESS.

6 BUT IN CONTRAST, THE SEARCH WARRANTS, WHICH IN THIS
7 CASE WERE FILED WITH THIS COURT AND BEFORE THAT FILED WITH THE
8 STATE COURT, AND THE PLEADINGS THAT WERE FILED IN THE DOCKET,
9 THE GOVERNMENT ARGUES THAT THE PIMA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
10 INVESTIGATIVE MATERIALS ARE NOT JUDICIAL RECORDS. THEY
11 HAVEN'T BEEN FILED NOR LODGED WITH THE COURT FOR ANY PURPOSE.
12 AND INDEED, AS I HAVE ASSURED YOU, MR. BODNEY, I HAVEN'T EVEN
13 SEEN THEM.

14 I THINK THERE'S SOME FACIAL MERIT TO THE
15 GOVERNMENT'S POSITION THAT THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
16 EXPLICITLY ALLOW FOR INTERVENTION, BUT THERE IS NO COUNTERPART
17 IN THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. AND AS THE GOVERNMENT
18 ARGUES, INTERVENTIONS TYPICALLY IN CONNECTION WITH YOKE TO THE
19 PUBLIC'S PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT OF ACCESS.

20 AS I MENTIONED TO MR. BODNEY, I'M IN THIS CASE NOT
21 GOING TO ASSUME THAT YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO SPEAK BECAUSE I
22 THINK THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE IS INTERRELATED TO A PROCEDURAL
23 ONE. I THINK I HAVE TO DEFINE THE CHARACTER OF THE RECORD
24 SOUGHT, IF THAT INFORMS WHETHER YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO
25 INTERVENE IN THIS CASE.

1 YOU HAVE RELIED IN YOUR PAPERS ON BEHALF OF YOUR
2 CLIENTS ON THE WECHT CASE TO ASSERT THE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION.
3 IN WECHT, AT THE BEHEST OF THE PRESS, THE DISTRICT COURT
4 UNSEALED PERSONNEL FILES OF AN FBI INVESTIGATOR/WITNESS AFTER
5 THE PROSECUTION ASKED FOR GUIDANCE ON WHETHER IT HAD TO
6 PRODUCE THOSE RECORDS TO THE DEFENSE.

7 AND THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THAT CASE HELD THAT THE
8 UNSEALING -- UPHELD THE UNSEALING ORDER, BUT IT DID SO ONLY ON
9 THE GROUNDS THAT THE MATERIALS HAD ACTUALLY BEEN FILED WITH
10 THE DISTRICT COURT; IN OTHER WORDS, THE COURT HAD THOSE
11 MATERIALS IN ITS POSSESSION.

12 I DON'T THINK THE MATERIALS IN WECHT ARE ANALOGOUS
13 TO THE INVESTIGATION MATERIALS HERE. AS I'VE MENTIONED, AND I
14 REITERATE AGAIN, THESE MATERIALS THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THIS
15 ORDER HAVE NEITHER BEEN LODGED -- AND LODGING IS ENOUGH, I
16 GRANT YOU, TO CONVERT THESE INTO JUDICIAL RECORDS. THEY'VE
17 NEITHER BEEN LODGED NOR FILED WITH THIS COURT.

18 AND LIKEWISE, YOU MENTIONED BLAGOJEVICH. I'M NOT
19 MOVED BY THE HOLDING IN BLAGOJEVICH. AS I SAID, THAT GRANTED
20 THE PRESS THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE, SEEK THE NAMES OF THE JURORS
21 WHO WERE ANONYMOUSLY IMPANELED. BUT IT WAS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT
22 THE COURT AND THE COURT RECORDS REFLECTED THEIR REAL NAMES AND
23 THAT THERE WAS A JUDICIAL RECORD REFLECTING THOSE NAMES, WHICH
24 COULD PROPERLY BE THE SUBJECT OF AT LEAST REQUEST TO OPEN THAT
25 UP.

1 NOTWITHSTANDING MY DOUBT ABOUT THE RIGHT TO
2 INTERVENE IN THIS CASE, I'M GOING TO ASSUME THAT YOU HAVE THAT
3 RIGHT, AS I SAID, BECAUSE I THINK IT'S TIED TO THE RIGHT OF
4 ACCESS GENERALLY.

5 THE NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HERE HAVE ARGUED THAT THEY'RE
6 ENTITLED TO INVESTIGATIVE MATERIALS OR SOME PORTION OF THEM
7 BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT PROMISED AS MUCH IN ITS ORIGINAL MOTION
8 FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. THIS IS NOT A FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENT, BUT
9 I THINK IT MISSES THE POINT.

10 AS I MENTIONED TO MR. BODNEY, THE GOVERNMENT DID
11 AVOW AN INTENT IN ITS MOTION TO REVIEW DILIGENTLY THE CONTENTS
12 OF THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE FILES AND DETERMINE WHAT MATERIALS
13 OUGHT TO BE EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE PROTECTIVE ORDER
14 AND THEN DISCLOSE THOSE MATERIALS TO *THE WASHINGTON POST*.

15 BEHIND THE INTENT, THOUGH, WAS THE RECOGNITION THAT
16 SOME OF THE MATERIALS IN THE FILE WOULD NOT TRIGGER PRIVACY OR
17 FAIR TRIAL INTEREST OR OTHER PUBLICITY CONCERNS. AND THE
18 GOVERNMENT ITSELF PROPOSED REVIEWING THE RECORDS AND THEN
19 SUBMITTING THEM TO THE COURT TO MAKE A FINAL REVIEW.

20 I FOUND ON FIRST BLUSH WHEN THAT WAS PRESENTED TO ME
21 THAT THE NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAD NO ENFORCEABLE RIGHT OF ACCESS
22 TO THOSE MATERIALS BECAUSE, AS I SAID, THEY FALL INTO THE
23 CATEGORY OF DISCOVERY AND, AS SUCH, THEY'RE NOT CONSIDERED
24 JUDICIAL RECORDS UNDER FEDERAL LAW.

25 THIS SORT OF LEADS TO THE ISSUE OF WHAT'S THE EFFECT

1 OF THE STATUTE HERE THAT CRIMINALIZES THE ATTEMPTED
2 ASSASSINATION OF A MEMBER OF CONGRESS? THE GOVERNMENT'S TAKEN
3 THE POSITION THAT IT PREEMPTS STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
4 THEIR LAWS UNTIL THIS CASE IS COMPLETED. AND INDEED,
5 SECTION (F) OF 351 --

6 IS THAT THE STATUTE, MR. KLEINDIENST, 351?

7 MR. KLEINDIENST: I BELIEVE SO.

8 THE COURT: YEAH.

9 -- DOES STATE THAT. AND I'VE LOOKED EVEN AT THE
10 PREEMPTION CASES TO TRY TO DECIDE THIS.

11 I THINK WHAT'S HAPPENED IS THAT JURISDICTION OVER
12 THIS MATTER, MR. BODNEY, HAS BEEN CEDED TO THE FEDERAL COURT,
13 WHICH MEANS FEDERAL LAW APPLIES. FOR THE TIME BEING, FEDERAL
14 LAW APPLIES. I'M NOT REALLY MOVED BY THE ARIZONA STATUTE
15 HERE. I DON'T THINK IT HAS ANY APPLICATION TO WHAT I DO.

16 I MEAN THAT IN THE MOST RESPECTFUL SENSE. I'M
17 WILLING TO BE COGNIZANT OF IT. I'M WILLING TO RECOGNIZE LOCAL
18 TRADITION AND THAT WE'RE IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ALBEIT IT IN
19 A FEDERAL COURT, BUT IT'S NOT BINDING ON ME.

20 WHAT IS BINDING ON ME ARE THE FEDERAL CASES WHICH
21 DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDICIAL RECORDS AND DISCOVERY, AND
22 THIS CLEARLY FALLS INTO THE LATTER CATEGORY, THESE
23 INVESTIGATIVE RECORDS DO. THEY'RE NOT JUDICIAL RECORDS.

24 AND LET'S ASSUME FOR A MINUTE THAT I'M WRONG ON THAT
25 SCORE, MR. BODNEY. YOU HAVE BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION THE

1 GOVERNMENT'S FALLBACK POSITION, WHICH IS UNDER THE LOCAL
2 RULE 57.2, THAT THE COURT HAS THE POWER HERE, UNDER THIS
3 FEDERAL COURT'S LOCAL RULE, TO CUT BACK ON THE DISSEMINATION
4 OF INFORMATION.

5 THE RULE PROVIDES "IN WIDELY PUBLICIZED OR
6 SENSATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES, THE COURT, ON MOTION OF EITHER
7 PARTY OR ON ITS OWN MOTION, MAY ISSUE A SPECIAL ORDER
8 GOVERNING SUCH MATTERS AS EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS BY THE
9 PARTIES AND WITNESSES THAT ARE LIKELY TO INTERFERE WITH THE
10 RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A FAIR TRIAL AND AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND
11 ANY OTHER MATTERS WHICH THE COURT MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE FOR
12 INCLUSION IN SUCH ORDER."

13 I'VE DONE MY BEST TO BE BALANCED AND FAIR AND
14 SENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS AS I'VE TOLD YOU I WOULD BE, BUT I'M
15 VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DISSEMINATION OR RELEASE OF THE RAW
16 INVESTIGATIVE MATERIALS HERE. I THINK THERE'S A REAL RISK
17 THAT THOSE THINGS WOULD DENY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER A FAIR
18 TRIAL AND ACTUALLY INVITE THE SPECTER OF THE CASE BEING TRIED
19 IN THE MEDIA BEFORE IT EVER GETS TRIED IN COURT.

20 SOME OF THE THINGS THAT ARE IN THE REPORTS MAY NEVER
21 COME IN, NEVER SEE THE LIGHT OF DAY IN A COURTROOM BECAUSE
22 THEY'RE INADMISSIBLE; HEARSAY ACCOUNTS OR ACCOUNTS FROM PEOPLE
23 THAT ARE SPECULATING OR DON'T REALLY KNOW THE BASIS FOR WHAT
24 THEY'RE REPORTING.

25 SO I HAVE A CONCERN ABOUT THAT. ASSUMING I'M WRONG

1 ON THIS ISSUE, ASSUMING THAT THE ARIZONA LAW HAS MORE PLAY
2 THAN I'M GIVING IT IN MY FINDINGS TODAY --

3 THE DEFENDANT: THANK YOU FOR THE FREE KILL. SHE
4 DIED IN FRONT OF ME. YOUR CHEESINESS.

5 (DEFENDANT REMOVED FROM COURTROOM BY MARSHALS)

6 THE COURT: ANYWAY, MR. BODNEY, AS I WAS SAYING,
7 EVEN IF YOU'RE RIGHT AND I'M WRONG ON THIS SCORE ABOUT THE
8 APPLICATION OF THE ARIZONA PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LAW, I WOULD
9 STILL INVOKE MY DISCRETION UNDER 57.2 TO PREVENT THE
10 DISSEMINATION OF A LOT OF THE MATERIAL THAT MY SENSE TELLS ME
11 ARE PART OF SHERIFF'S INVESTIGATIVE MATERIALS.

12 NOW, HERE'S ONE LAST POINT. AND AS I SAID, I'LL
13 GIVE YOU AN ORDER THAT THOROUGHLY VETS WHAT MY REASONS ARE ON
14 THIS.

15 THE LAST POINT IS THIS: YOU HAVE CHARACTERIZED THIS
16 AS A SHERIFF'S INVESTIGATION. IT NEVER REALLY WAS THAT. IT
17 WAS ALWAYS A JOINT INVESTIGATION. WHAT LITTLE I KNOW ABOUT
18 THE HISTORICAL BASIS IS THAT THE FBI WAS INVOLVED FROM THE
19 GET-GO. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES WERE INVOLVED.

20 AND INDEED SECTION 351, ANOTHER SUBSECTION MANDATES
21 THAT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SHALL INVESTIGATE
22 CASES ARISING UNDER THAT TITLE, UNDER THAT SECTION. AND EVEN
23 THE SHERIFF'S COUNSEL IN HIS LETTER TO THE GOVERNMENT
24 ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT WAS ALWAYS A JOINT INVESTIGATION.

25 AND SO I THINK THAT ACKNOWLEDGMENT, THAT REALITY

1 GIVES THE COURT THE RIGHT AND INDICATES THAT THE COURT SHOULD
2 RELY ON FEDERAL LAW, INCLUDING THE LOCAL RULES HERE.

3 NOW, ALL THOSE THINGS HAVING BEEN SAID, I DID --
4 NEVER INTENDED WHEN I ISSUED THE ORDER TO FORBID THE
5 GOVERNMENT FROM RELEASING, PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT THAT IT
6 HAD EARLIER MADE WITH THE PRESS, THOSE MATERIALS THAT DON'T
7 IMPACT ON PRIVACY CONCERNS, FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS, AND THE LIKE.

8 SO I AM GOING TO MODIFY THE ORDER TO MAKE THAT
9 CLEAR. I'M NOT GOING TO DIRECT YOU TO DO ANY PARTICULAR
10 THING. I'M NOT GOING TO DIRECT YOU, IN PARTICULAR, TO COMPILE
11 AN INVENTORY AND PRESENT ANYTHING IN CAMERA TO ME.

12 MR. BODNEY, I STILL THINK THAT -- I DON'T EVEN KNOW
13 THE SCOPE OF THESE RECORDS, BUT I'M ASSUMING THERE'S PROBABLY
14 THOUSANDS OF PAGES. AND I JUST THINK IN A CASE WHERE IT'S NOT
15 REQUIRED THAT I DO THAT, WHY WOULD I UNDERTAKE TO DO THAT?
16 WHY WOULD I LOOK OVER THEIR SHOULDER AND LOOK AT ALL OF THESE
17 THINGS?

18 BUT TO THE EXTENT THERE'S ANY MISUNDERSTANDING I'VE
19 DIRECTED THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO GIVE ANYTHING OVER, I'M GOING
20 TO MODIFY THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. IF YOU WANT TO LOOK AT THOSE
21 THINGS AND HONOR THE PUBLIC AND PRESS' REQUEST TO THE EXTENT
22 THAT IT DOESN'T INTERFERE WITH THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT OR
23 YOUR OWN RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL, THEN I URGE YOU AND ENCOURAGE
24 YOU TO DO THAT.

25 SO A WRITTEN ORDER WILL FOLLOW TODAY, MR. BODNEY,

1 AND YOU'LL -- IF YOU -- I'M NOT ENCOURAGING YOU TO APPEAL, BUT
2 MAYBE OUR FRIENDS ON THE NINTH CIRCUIT WILL SEE IT DIFFERENTLY
3 THAN I DO. YOU'LL HAVE THAT AVENUE WITH A WRITTEN ORDER.

4 MR. BODNEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

5 MR. KLEINDIENST: YOUR HONOR, MAY I BE HEARD?

6 THE COURT: YES.

7 MR. KLEINDIENST: OBVIOUSLY, THE COURT IS AWARE OF
8 WHAT JUST HAPPENED HERE. I WOULD, JUST FOR THE RECORD, NOTE
9 AT ABOUT 11:40, THE DEFENDANT SAID SOMETHING OUT LOUD AND WAS
10 REMOVED FROM THE COURTROOM BY THE DEPUTY MARSHALS.

11 THE COURT: HE DID. THAT'S CORRECT.

12 MR. KLEINDIENST: I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE COURT'S
13 INTENTION IS THEREAFTER.

14 THE COURT: MY INTENTION IS TO GO FORWARD AND DO
15 WHAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO DO TODAY. THERE HAS BEEN, I THINK,
16 SOME DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PARTIES ABOUT WHETHER EVEN
17 MR. LOUGHNER WANTED TO ATTEND TODAY. BUT IF HE CAN COMPOSE
18 HIMSELF, THEN HE'S ENTITLED TO BE HERE. THE CASE LAW IN THE
19 NINTH CIRCUIT IS THAT A COMPETENCY HEARING IS A CRITICAL STAGE
20 AND THE DEFENDANT HAS A RIGHT TO ATTEND.

21 NOW, THAT RIGHT IS CONDITIONED ON GOOD BEHAVIOR AND
22 COMPLYING WITH THE COURT PROTOCOL. SO I DON'T WANT HIM TO ACT
23 OUT OR SPEAK UP. HE'S HERE TO LISTEN AND HEAR THE BASES FOR
24 RULINGS AND HEAR ARGUMENT MADE ON HIS BEHALF. BUT --

25 MS. CLARKE?

1 MS. CLARKE: WE'RE PREPARED TO PROCEED AND WAIVE HIS
2 PRESENCE, YOUR HONOR.

3 THE COURT: YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE THAT I'VE
4 REFERRED TO?

5 MS. CLARKE: I AM.

6 THE COURT: I'M, ON THE ONE HAND, A LITTLE WORRIED
7 ABOUT TAKING A WAIVER FROM HIS COUNSEL RATHER THAN FROM HIM.

8 LET ME ASK THE MARSHAL, IS MR. LOUGHNER -- HAS HE
9 CALMED DOWN A LITTLE BIT IN THE BACK?

10 MS. CLARKE: YOUR HONOR, COULD WE JUST HAVE A
11 MOMENT. WE HAD ARRANGED THE OPTION OF A TELEVISION VIEWING
12 FOR MR. LOUGHNER.

13 THE COURT: I'LL EMBRACE THAT, MS. CLARKE, BUT I
14 WANT TO MAKE SURE -- I WANT TO TALK TO HIM FOR JUST A SECOND
15 ABOUT IF HE'S GOING TO STAY HERE, HE HAS TO SIT AND COMPOSE
16 HIMSELF AS A GENTLEMAN. IF I GET HIS ASSURANCE THAT HE WILL,
17 THEN WE'LL TRY AGAIN. IF HE ACTS UP AGAIN, THEN WE'LL GO TO
18 PLAN B, WHICH I EMBRACE, WHICH IS LET HIM WATCH THE
19 PROCEEDINGS IN A ROOM.

20 BUT NOW THAT I'M TOLD HE'S CALMER, I'M GOING TO TALK
21 TO HIM AND SEE IF I CAN CALM HIM DOWN A LITTLE BIT.

22 MS. CLARKE: IN THAT EVENT, COULD WE TAKE A BRIEF
23 RECESS?

24 THE COURT: SURE.

25 YOU WANT TO TALK TO HIM FIRST?

1 MS. CLARKE: YES.

2 THE COURT: OKAY. WE'LL BE IN RECESS, WHAT, TEN
3 MINUTES, MS. CLARKE? WILL THAT DO?

4 MS. CLARKE: YES.

5 THE COURT: TEN MINUTES.

6 (RECESS)

7 THE COURT: IS THE DEFENDANT WILLING TO COME BACK
8 OUT? ARE YOU PLANNING TO BRING HIM OUT?

9 MS. CLARKE: MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT GOVERNMENT
10 COUNSEL IS ASKING THAT THE COURT TAKE A WAIVER OF HIS PRESENCE
11 DIRECTLY FROM HIM IF THAT'S HIS CHOICE.

12 THE COURT: MR. LOUGHNER --

13 THE DEFENDANT: YES.

14 THE COURT: -- YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE HERE IN COURT
15 AND TO LISTEN TO WHAT'S GOING ON, WHAT'S BEING ADVOCATED ON
16 YOUR BEHALF, AND THE COURT'S RULINGS. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE
17 PHYSICALLY PRESENT. IF YOU DON'T WANT TO EXERCISE THAT RIGHT,
18 YOU DON'T HAVE TO.

19 I UNDERSTAND THAT A TV SCREEN THAT WILL BROADCAST
20 THE PROCEEDINGS HAS BEEN SET UP INSIDE. AND IF YOUR
21 PREFERENCE IS TO SIT INSIDE AND WATCH IT ON THE TV SCREEN,
22 THEN I'LL HONOR THAT PREFERENCE.

23 WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO?

24 THE DEFENDANT: I WANT TO WATCH THE TV SCREEN.

25 THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU JOIN IN HIS WAIVER, THEN,

1 OF HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT HERE, MS. CLARKE?

2 MS. CLARKE: YES, YOUR HONOR.

3 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

4 MR. LOUGHNER, THEN, MAY BE INSIDE. WE'LL HAVE --
5 THERE WILL BE A MARSHAL IN THERE. IF HE CHANGES HIS MIND AT
6 ANY POINT, I'M TO BE NOTIFIED. IF HE WANTS TO COME BACK OUT
7 AND BE PRESENT, THEN LET ME KNOW RIGHT AWAY.

8 THE MARSHAL: YES, SIR.

9 MS. CLARKE: ONE OF THE DEFENSE COUNSEL WILL BE WITH
10 HIM.

11 THE COURT: VERY GOOD. THANK YOU, MS. CLARKE.

12 MR. KLEINDIENST, ARE YOU SATISFIED THAT HE PROVIDED
13 A WAIVER OF ANY RIGHT HE HAS TO BE PRESENT?

14 MR. KLEINDIENST: YES, YOUR HONOR.

15 THE COURT: THERE'S ANOTHER HOUSEKEEPING MATTER THAT
16 I CAN JUST MOVE QUICKLY. THERE WAS SOME B.O.P. PROTOCOL, I
17 UNDERSTAND.

18 THOSE HAVE BEEN BEFORE THE COURT AND ARE NOW THE
19 SUBJECT OF AGREEMENT AND STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES?

20 MS. CLARKE: THAT'S WHAT WE EXPECT, YOUR HONOR.

21 THE COURT: IS THAT RIGHT, MR. KLEINDIENST?

22 MR. KLEINDIENST: YES, YOUR HONOR.

23 THE COURT: THEN I WON'T DEAL WITH ANY OF THAT.

24 THE TWO REMAINING ISSUES THAT I SEE ARE THE QUESTION
25 OF THE DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY AND THEN THE MATTER OF SOME

1 LETTERS THAT WERE SENT THAT I PASSED ON TO YOU, MS. CLARKE.
2 BUT I THINK THE TWO THINGS KIND OF BLEND TOGETHER AT THIS
3 POINT, SO I'LL DEAL WITH THE COMPETENCY ISSUE FIRST.

4 THE COURT HAS RECEIVED REPORTS FROM TWO MEDICAL
5 PROFESSIONALS: A PSYCHOLOGIST, PHD; AND A PSYCHIATRIST.
6 THOSE WERE DISSEMINATED TO COUNSEL, WHO'VE HAD A CHANCE TO
7 REVIEW THEM.

8 I THEN SENT OUT AN ORDER ASKING IF EITHER SIDE
9 THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE A NEED TO FOLLOW UP WITH
10 QUESTIONING OF EITHER OF THE EXAMINERS AND WAS TOLD THAT
11 NEITHER PARTY THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE A NEED TO HAVE THEM HERE
12 PRESENT TO BE EXAMINED ON THEIR REPORTS OR THEIR FINDINGS.

13 YOU CONFIRM THAT DECISION TODAY ON BEHALF OF THE
14 DEFENDANT, MS. CLARKE?

15 MS. CLARKE: YES, WE DO.

16 THE COURT: MR. KLEINDIENST, ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED
17 STATES?

18 MR. KLEINDIENST: THAT'S RIGHT, YOUR HONOR.

19 THE COURT: DOES EITHER SIDE WANT TO PRESENT ANY
20 ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE BEYOND WHAT APPEARS IN THOSE REPORTS?

21 MS. CLARKE: WE HAVE NO ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

22 THE COURT: MR. KLEINDIENST?

23 MR. KLEINDIENST: LIKEWISE FOR THE GOVERNMENT.

24 THE COURT: ANY ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT ON THEM OR ARE
25 YOU PREPARED TO LET ME MAKE MY FINDINGS BASED ON THE REPORTS

1 AND WHAT'S BEEN SUBMITTED?

2 MR. KLEINDIENST: WE REST ON THE REPORTS.

3 MS. CLARKE: SAME HERE.

4 THE COURT: THE QUESTION OF DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY
5 TO STAND TRIAL WAS RAISED IN AN EARLIER PROCEEDING. THE LEGAL
6 STANDARD FOR WHETHER A DEFENDANT IS COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
7 IS A STRAIGHTFORWARD AND FAMILIAR STANDARD.

8 THE QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT ARE THESE: DOES THE
9 DEFENDANT HAVE A RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCEEDING?
10 THAT'S THE FIRST QUESTION. SECOND, IS HE ABLE TO ASSIST HIS
11 ATTORNEY IN HIS OWN DEFENSE?

12 THIS COURT APPOINTED TWO EXPERIENCED AND QUALIFIED
13 EXPERTS TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER MR. LOUGHNER MEETS
14 THIS STANDARD AT THE PRESENT TIME. ONE OF THE EXPERTS THAT I
15 APPOINTED WAS DR. CHRISTINA PIETZ. SHE HAS BEEN A STAFF
16 PSYCHOLOGIST FOR THE PAST 21 YEARS AT THE UNITED STATES
17 MEDICAL CENTER FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS LOCATED IN SPRINGFIELD,
18 MISSOURI.

19 DR. PIETZ HOLDS A PHD IN COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY. SHE
20 HAS A MASTER'S DEGREE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND A BACHELOR'S
21 DEGREE IN PSYCHOLOGY. SHE'S BOARD CERTIFIED IN FORENSIC
22 PSYCHOLOGY, MEANING PSYCHOLOGY HAVING TO DO WITH COURTS AND
23 COURT PROCEEDINGS.

24 AMONG HER MANY PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS, SHE'S BOTH
25 A MEMBER AND THE PRESIDENT ELECT OF THE AMERICAN BOARD OF

1 FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY.

2 THE COURT LIKEWISE APPOINTED A PSYCHIATRIST ON THIS
3 CASE, DR. MATTHEW CARROLL. DR. CARROLL IS BOARD CERTIFIED IN
4 FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY. HE RECEIVED A BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN
5 BIOLOGY AND A MEDICAL DEGREE FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF
6 MEDICINE IN 1989.

7 AFTER COMPLETING HIS CLINICAL TRAINING AND HIS
8 FELLOWSHIP, HE SERVED FOR MANY YEARS AS A STAFF PSYCHIATRIST
9 IN VARIOUS HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL FACILITIES. SINCE 2002, HE
10 HAS MAINTAINED HIS OWN PRACTICE SPECIALIZING IN FORENSIC
11 PSYCHIATRY.

12 THE COURT IS PERSONALLY FAMILIAR WITH DR. CARROLL.
13 HE'S A FREQUENT EXPERT WITNESS IN CASES IN THE SOUTHERN
14 DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

15 DR. CARROLL HOLDS NUMEROUS PROFESSIONAL
16 CERTIFICATIONS, INCLUDING BOARD CERTIFICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY
17 AND FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY.

18 ADDITIONALLY, HE IS AN ASSISTANT CLINICAL PROFESSOR
19 OF PSYCHIATRY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
20 SCHOOL OF MEDICINE.

21 THE COURT WILL PUT THE COMPLETE CURRICULUM VITAE FOR
22 BOTH DOCTORS INTO THE RECORD. THEY WILL BE RECEIVED AND MADE
23 PART OF THE RECORD THAT CAN BE REVIEWED BY ANYONE WHO HAS
24 INTEREST.

25 DR. PIETZ AND DR. CARROLL ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF

1 MR. LOUGHNER'S PRESENT COMPETENCY IN COMPREHENSIVE, WRITTEN
2 REPORTS. WITH THE COOPERATION OF BOTH COUNSEL -- ALL COUNSEL
3 IN THIS CASE, BOTH DOCTORS WERE GIVEN ACCESS TO AND THEY
4 CONSIDERED A WIDE SPECTRUM OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION THAT
5 INFORMS THE ISSUE THAT THEY WERE ASKED TO ADDRESS.

6 MUCH OF THE INFORMATION THAT THE DOCTORS CONSIDERED
7 WAS HISTORICAL AND PREDATED THE DATE OF THE CHARGED OFFENSES.
8 IT INCLUDED OBSERVATIONS AND ANECDOTES AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS
9 FROM MANY WITNESSES WHO ARE PERSONALLY FAMILIAR WITH THE
10 DEFENDANT OR HAD ONGOING CONTACT WITH HIM.

11 ALTHOUGH DR. PIETZ AND DR. CARROLL HAD SOME CONTACT
12 WITH ONE ANOTHER DURING THE EXAMINATION PERIOD, EACH PREPARED
13 A SEPARATE REPORT, AND EACH REPORT WAS BASED ON THE DOCTOR'S
14 OWN INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS AND EXPERIENCE. THEY DID NOT
15 COLLABORATE IN THEIR FINDINGS. INSTEAD, THEY REACHED
16 CONCLUSIONS INDEPENDENTLY.

17 BOTH DOCTORS SUBMITTED THEIR REPORTS IN A TIMELY
18 MANNER TO THE COURT. AND I, AS I SAID, IN TURN PROVIDED THEM
19 TO BOTH SIDES.

20 DR. PIETZ'S REPORT IS 52 PAGES LONG. DR. CARROLL'S
21 REPORT IS 43 PAGES LONG.

22 AFTER RECEIVING THE DOCTORS' REPORTS, COUNSEL WERE
23 GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE DOCTORS UNDER OATH.
24 THERE WAS AN ORDER THAT WENT OUT TO THAT EFFECT. YOU'VE HEARD
25 TODAY THAT THEY DECLINED AN OPPORTUNITY. THEY'VE INDICATED

1 THEIR WILLINGNESS AT THIS POINT TO LET THE COURT MAKE A
2 DECISION ON THE BASIS OF THEIR REPORTS.

3 THE DOCTORS' CLINICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE DEFENDANT
4 WERE VIDEOTAPED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S ORDER, AND THE
5 VIDEOTAPES WERE ALSO MADE AVAILABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. IN
6 ADDITION TO CANVASSING THE REPORTS THAT I MENTIONED TO YOU
7 FROM THE DOCTORS, THE COURT HAS ALSO VIEWED APPROXIMATELY
8 18 HOURS OF VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEWS WITH THE DEFENDANT THAT WAS
9 CONDUCTED BY THE DOCTORS.

10 BECAUSE THE REPORTS AND THE VIDEOTAPES CONTAIN
11 MATERIAL THAT IS GENERALLY PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL, SUBJECT
12 TO PRIVACY CONCERNS THAT WE ALL HAVE AS AMERICAN CITIZENS WITH
13 RESPECT TO OUR MEDICAL RECORDS, THUS, IN THEIR PRESENT
14 UNREDACTED FORM, THEY'RE PROTECTED FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BY
15 LAW. THE COURT HAS ORDERED THAT THEY'RE NOT TO BE PUBLICLY
16 FILED IN THEIR UNREDACTED FORM IN THE CASE DOCKET IN THIS
17 CASE.

18 AND THERE'S NOTHING MYSTERIOUS ABOUT THIS. AS I
19 SAID, MUCH OF THE MATERIAL IS PRIVATE MEDICAL MATERIAL. IT'S
20 PRIVILEGED. SOME OF IT IS MATERIAL THAT WAS PRESENTED TO THE
21 GRAND JURY THAT IS STATUTORILY PROTECTED AT THIS POINT, AND
22 THERE ARE RULES THAT FORBID THAT FROM BEING DISSEMINATED.

23 HOWEVER, UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT PUBLIC INTEREST IN
24 THE CASE GENERALLY AND IN THE COMPETENCY DETERMINATION THAT
25 THE COURT ANNOUNCES TODAY, I'M GOING TO SUMMARIZE THE

1 CONCLUSIONS OF BOTH DOCTORS AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE QUESTION OF
2 PRESENT COMPETENCY AND TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW TO TELL
3 YOU WHAT THE BASES FOR THE DOCTORS' FINDINGS ARE.

4 BOTH DOCTORS WHO EXAMINED MR. LOUGHNER IN THIS CASE
5 DETERMINED THAT HE IS NOT PRESENTLY COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL.

6 DR. PIETZ CONCLUDES THAT MR. LOUGHNER SUFFERS FROM
7 MAJOR MENTAL ILLNESS, SCHIZOPHRENIA, WHICH SHE DIAGNOSES AS
8 UNDIFFERENTIATED TYPE.

9 SHE SAW THE DEFENDANT DAILY OVER AN APPROXIMATE
10 ONE-MONTH PERIOD. SHE CONDUCTED A SERIES OF 12 INTERVIEWS
11 WITH THE DEFENDANT THAT SPANNED APPROXIMATELY NINE HOURS. SHE
12 FOUND AT THE PRESENT TIME THAT HIS THOUGHTS ARE RANDOM AND
13 DISORGANIZED, THAT HE DEMONSTRATES DISORGANIZED THINKING, AND
14 THAT HE HAS PROMINENT DELUSIONS. AT TIMES, HE ANSWERED SIMPLE
15 QUESTIONS WITH LENGTHY ANSWERS THAT WERE NONSENSICAL. IN MANY
16 INSTANCES, IT WAS NEVER CLEAR HOW THE RESPONSES WERE RELEVANT
17 TO THE QUESTIONS THAT HAD BEEN PUT TO HIM.

18 DURING THE ONE-MONTH-LONG PERIOD THAT DR. PIETZ
19 EXAMINED MR. LOUGHNER, SHE ATTEMPTED TO ADMINISTER A VARIETY
20 OF STANDARDIZED PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS. SHE REPORTS THAT IT WAS
21 DIFFICULT TO KEEP MR. LOUGHNER ON TASK AND THAT HE FREQUENTLY
22 DID NOT COMPLETE THE TESTS OR ANSWER ALL OF THE QUESTIONS THAT
23 WERE PUT TO HIM. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THERE WAS VERY LITTLE IN
24 THE WAY OF HELPFUL DATA THAT WAS GENERATED BY THE ATTEMPTED
25 ADMINISTRATION OF THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS.

1 HAVING REVIEWED THE VIDEOTAPES OF DR. PIETZ'S
2 INTERVIEW WITH THE DEFENDANT, THE COURT AGREES WITH HER
3 CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE DEFENDANT'S DEemeanOR AND WITH HER
4 DESCRIPTIONS OF HIS ANSWERS.

5 THE CLINICAL INTERVIEW TAPES DEMONSTRATE THAT
6 DR. PIETZ ASKED THE DEFENDANT STRAIGHTFORWARD QUESTIONS ABOUT
7 THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT'S SUPPOSED TO FUNCTION AND THAT
8 THE DEFENDANT GENERALLY WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE RATIONAL OR
9 COHERENT ANSWERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS.

10 ALSO, WHILE IT APPEARS THAT HE HAD SOME SUPERFICIAL
11 UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, HE WAS NOT ABLE TO
12 COMPREHEND THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES WITH ANY RATIONAL
13 UNDERSTANDING. INDEED, MANY OF THE ANSWERS THAT HE GAVE
14 ILLUSTRATED AN IRRATIONAL THOUGHT PROCESS ABOUT THE CHARGES
15 AND ABOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS IN GENERAL.

16 MORE PARTICULARLY, HIS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT
17 THE LEGAL PROCESS NEVER MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT
18 THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IS, WHAT THE ROLE OF THE JURY IS, HOW
19 THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE ARE SUPPOSED TO FUNCTION.

20 LIKEWISE, DR. PIETZ OPINES AND THE COURT'S REVIEW OF
21 THE INTERVIEW TAPES CONFIRMS THAT HE HAS NO PRESENT
22 UNDERSTANDING OF THE POTENTIAL PLEAS OR STRATEGIC CHOICES THAT
23 ARE AVAILABLE TO HIM.

24 DR. PIETZ ALSO CONCLUDED FROM HER INTERVIEWS THAT
25 THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT AT THE PRESENT TIME HAVE A RATIONAL

1 UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH HE'S IMMersed, AND
2 THE COURT CONCURS WITH THAT CONCLUSION.

3 SHE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT MR. LOUGHNER'S ANSWERS TO
4 QUESTIONS IN SOME INSTANCES MANIFEST WHAT SHE CHARACTERIZES AS
5 IRRATIONAL DISTRUST IN HIS LAWYERS AND OF THE COUNSEL AND
6 ADVICE THAT THEY'VE PROVIDED HIM SO FAR.

7 I USE THE TERM "IRRATIONAL DISTRUST" BECAUSE THE
8 COURT IS AWARE OF THE ATTEMPTS AND THE EFFORTS THAT
9 MR. LOUGHNER'S LAWYERS HAVE MADE TO TRY TO REPRESENT HIM IN
10 THIS CASE. AND ALL OF THE EFFORTS OF WHICH I'M AWARE WERE
11 PERFECTLY REASONABLE AND THEY'RE INDICATED AND THEY'RE RIGHT.

12 DR. PIETZ CONCLUDED THAT HIS MENTAL ILLNESS AT THIS
13 POINT IS A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO HIS ABILITY TO ASSIST IN HIS
14 OWN DEFENSE AND TO ASSIST WITH HIS LAWYERS AND THAT HE HAS
15 DELUSIONS THAT PREVENT HIM FROM RATIONALLY CONSIDERING THE
16 VARIETY OF LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES THAT HE
17 FACES.

18 IF HE CAN'T CONSIDER THE COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE
19 TO HIM, HE CAN'T MEANINGFULLY ASSIST IN HIS OWN DEFENSE.

20 DR. PIETZ, THEREFORE, CONCLUDES THAT HE'S NOT PRESENTLY ABLE
21 TO RATIONALLY CONSULT WITH HIS LAWYERS AND TO ASSIST THEM IN
22 DEFENDING THIS CASE. THE COURT CONCURS WITH THAT CONCLUSION
23 AS WELL.

24 DR. CARROLL, THE PSYCHIATRIST, INTERVIEWED
25 MR. LOUGHNER OVER TWO DAYS FOR APPROXIMATELY SEVEN HOURS. HE

1 CONDUCTED FIVE INTERVIEWS WITH THE DEFENDANT. HE CONCLUDED
2 THAT THE DEFENDANT PRESENTLY SUFFERS FROM SCHIZOPHRENIA,
3 PARANOID TYPE.

4 DR. CARROLL OPINED WITH REASONABLE MEDICAL CERTAINTY
5 THAT MR. LOUGHNER HAS EXPERIENCED DELUSIONS, BIZARRE THINKING,
6 HALLUCINATIONS FOR GREATER THAN A SIX-MONTH PERIOD OF TIME.
7 BASED ON HIS REVIEW OF THE AVAILABLE MATERIALS, HE CONCLUDES
8 THE DEFENDANT'S MENTAL HEALTH HAS BEEN IN DECLINE FOR THE PAST
9 TWO OR THREE YEARS AND THAT HE HAS A HISTORY OF SUFFERING FROM
10 SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS.

11 DR. CARROLL DETERMINED THAT WHILE MR. LOUGHNER HAS A
12 BASIC AND RUDIMENTARY UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE
13 PROCEEDINGS, HE DOESN'T IN ANY REALISTIC SENSE GRASP THE
14 GRAVITY OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHARGES THAT HE'S FACING OR
15 THE SITUATION THAT HE'S IN. HE INSTEAD SEEMS TO BE FIXATED ON
16 INCONSEQUENTIAL AND UNRELATED ISSUES.

17 DR. CARROLL DETERMINED THAT THE DEFENDANT'S THINKING
18 ABOUT THE CHARGES AND ABOUT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN GENERAL IS
19 CLEARLY ILLOGICAL AND CONFUSED. IN TURN, THIS RESULTS IN A
20 SEVERE IMPAIRMENT TO HIS PLANNING OF LEGAL STRATEGIES. HE
21 DOESN'T HAVE A REASONABLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF
22 WITNESSES IN THE CASE, AND HIS PSYCHOTIC BELIEFS ABOUT THE
23 EVIDENCE CAUSE HIM TO BELIEVE HE WILL NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL
24 DUE TO A CONSPIRACY.

25 DR. CARROLL CONCLUDES THAT MR. LOUGHNER AT THE

1 PRESENT TIME IS UNABLE TO RATIONALLY UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND
2 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM. HAVING
3 THOROUGHLY STUDIED DR. CARROLL'S REPORT, HAVING VIEWED THE
4 VIDEOTAPES ALSO OF HIS INTERVIEWS WITH THE DEFENDANT, THE
5 COURT AGREES WITH DR. CARROLL'S CHARACTERIZATIONS OF HIS
6 PRESENT MENTAL STATE AND WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
7 DEFENDANT IS UNABLE AT THE PRESENT TIME TO UNDERSTAND
8 RATIONALLY THE PROCEEDINGS.

9 DR. CARROLL ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE DEFENDANT AT
10 PRESENT LABORS UNDER A PSYCHOTIC THOUGHT PROCESS WITH RESPECT
11 TO HIS LAWYERS. HIS COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS LAWYERS ARE RAMBLING
12 AND DISORGANIZED, AND HIS LEVEL OF IRRATIONALITY ABOUT THEIR
13 EFFORTS IS MANIFEST.

14 DR. CARROLL OPINES THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRESENT
15 LEVEL OF IRRATIONAL AND PSYCHOTIC THOUGHT PROCESS INTERFERES
16 WITH HIS INTERACTIONS WITH HIS OWN LAWYERS AND PREVENTS HIM
17 FROM WORKING WITH THEM OR WITH ANY LAWYER IN AN EFFECTIVE
18 MANNER IN HIS OWN DEFENSE AT THIS TIME.

19 IT'S DIFFICULT, DR. CARROLL CONCLUDES, IF NOT
20 IMPOSSIBLE -- WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR ANY
21 ATTORNEY TO TRY TO REASON WITH THE DEFENDANT. HE IS, IN
22 SHORT, UNABLE AT THE PRESENT TIME TO WORK WITH HIS LAWYERS
23 TO MAKE THE KIND OF STRATEGIC CHOICES THAT A PERSON IN
24 MR. LOUGHNER'S SITUATION MUST BE PREPARED TO MAKE.

25 DR. CARROLL CONCLUDES THAT MR. LOUGHNER AT THE

1 PRESENT TIME CAN'T PROPERLY ASSIST IN HIS DEFENSE DUE TO
2 MENTAL ILLNESS. AND AGAIN, HAVING THOROUGHLY CANVASSED HIS
3 REPORT AND THE REASONS GIVEN FOR HIS OPINION AND HAVING VIEWED
4 THE ENTIRETY OF THE INTERVIEWS ON VIDEOTAPE, THE COURT AGREES
5 WITH DR. CARROLL'S CONCLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANT IS UNABLE TO
6 ASSIST HIS LAWYERS IN DEFENDING HIMSELF ON HIS OWN DEFENSE.

7 NOW, IN A FORENSIC SETTING, IN A COURTROOM SETTING
8 WHERE THERE ARE CONSEQUENCES FOR CONDUCT, THE EXAMINERS IN THE
9 COURT ALWAYS HAVE TO BE CONCERNED WITH MALINGERING. IN LAY
10 TERMS, "MALINGERING" MEANS FAKING A MENTAL DISORDER.

11 BOTH DR. PIETZ AND DR. CARROLL CONSIDERED THE
12 POSSIBILITY THAT MR. LOUGHNER WAS MALINGERING, AND THEY
13 REJECTED IT.

14 INDIVIDUALS WHO MALINGER OR FAKE A MENTAL ILLNESS
15 TYPICALLY EXHIBIT AN INCONSISTENT PRESENTATION. THAT MEANS
16 THEY CAN'T KEEP IT UP OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THEY ALSO
17 TEND TO GROSSLY OVEREXAGGERATE THEIR SYMPTOMS OF MENTAL
18 ILLNESS. THEIR ANSWERS TEND TO BE TELLINGLY SELF-INTERESTED,
19 SELF-SERVING.

20 IN CONTRAST, IN HIS PROFILE, DR. PIETZ CONCLUDED
21 THAT THE DEFENDANT PRESENTED IN A CONSISTENT MANNER IN ALL OF
22 HER INTERACTIONS WITH HIM. SPECIFICALLY, HE DIDN'T APPEAR TO
23 HER TO BE OVERENDORING SYMPTOMS OF MENTAL ILLNESS.

24 ONE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS THAT DR. PIETZ WAS
25 ABLE TO PERFORM SPECIFICALLY IS DESIGNED TO FLUSH OUT

1 MALINGERING, AND NONE OF THE DEFENDANT'S ACHIEVED SCORES ON
2 THAT TEST PUT HIM IN THE PROBABLE OR DEFINITE FEIGNING RANGE.

3 IN ADDITION, DR. PIETZ SAYS ON THE BASIS OF
4 HISTORICAL EVIDENCE THAT SHE BELIEVED THAT THE DEFENDANT'S
5 THINKING BEHAVIOR HAD, EVEN BEFORE THE DATE OF THE CHARGES IN
6 THIS CASE, BECOME INCREASINGLY ODD AND BIZARRE FOR THE PAST
7 TWO YEARS. THIS IS A TELLTALE SIGN, SHE CONCLUDES, OF MENTAL
8 ILLNESS, NOT MALINGERING.

9 FINALLY, SHE POINTS OUT THAT MOST PEOPLE WHO TRY TO
10 FAKE MENTAL ILLNESS WANT TO BE PERCEIVED AS MENTALLY ILL, AND
11 YET MR. LOUGHNER DOES NOT. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE PERCEIVED
12 THAT WAY.

13 SIMILARLY, DR. CARROLL CITES EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION
14 OF THE DEFENDANT'S PREVIOUS BIZARRE BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOTIC
15 THINKING. HE, TOO, STATES THAT THE DEFENDANT DENIES BEING
16 MENTALLY ILL. IN FACT, HE SCOFFS AT THE IDEA.

17 DR. CARROLL ADDITIONALLY POINTS OUT THAT SOME OF
18 DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS THAT DR. CARROLL PUT TO
19 HIM WERE NOT PARTICULARLY HELPFUL OR BENEFICIAL TO THE
20 DEFENDANT. AND THIS, TOO, RUNS COUNTER TO THE DESIRE TO FAKE
21 MENTAL ILLNESS.

22 THE COURT TODAY AND AT THE TIME I REVIEWED THE
23 REPORTS AND THE VIDEOTAPES WAS ALSO MINDFUL OF THE POTENTIAL
24 FOR A DEFENDANT TO FAKE MENTAL ILLNESS, AND I'VE CONSIDERED
25 AND ALSO REJECTED THAT AS A POSSIBILITY HERE.

1 ON THIS ISSUE, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE JUDGMENT OF
2 THE PROFESSIONAL EXAMINERS IS REASONED AND SOUND AND THERE'S
3 AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR CONCLUSIONS THAT THE DEFENDANT
4 DID NOT MASQUERADE A MENTAL INCAPACITY AT THE PRESENT TIME TO
5 EITHER AVOID THE CRIMINAL CHARGES HE FACES OR FOR THE PURPOSE
6 OF UNDULY DELAYING THAT CASE. I'M CONVINCED OF THAT TODAY.

7 UNDER SECTION 4241(A) OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED
8 STATES CODE, A DEFENDANT HAS TO MEET TWO CRITERIA TO BE FOUND
9 INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL: FIRST, IT MUST BE SHOWN HE'S
10 SUFFERING FROM MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT. AND SECOND, THE
11 MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT MUST EITHER PREVENT THE DEFENDANT
12 FROM BEING ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
13 THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, IT MUST PREVENT THE
14 DEFENDANT FROM ASSISTING PROPERLY IN HIS DEFENSE.

15 THE COURT FINDS, BASED ON THE EVIDENCE THAT I'VE
16 SUMMARIZED BY A CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, THAT BOTH
17 CRITERIA ARE MET IN THIS CASE. AT THE PRESENT TIME,
18 MR. LOUGHNER DOESN'T HAVE A RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THESE
19 PROCEEDINGS, AND I FURTHER FIND IS UNABLE TO ASSIST HIS
20 LAWYERS IN MOUNTING A DEFENSE TO THE CHARGES THAT HE FACES.
21 THE COURT FINDS THAT HE IS PRESENTLY INCOMPETENT TO STAND
22 TRIAL.

23 NOW, WHEN THAT FINDING IS MADE BY THE COURT IN
24 SUBSECTION (D) OF THIS PROVISION OF LAW, 4241, DURESS, THAT
25 IF, AFTER A HEARING OF THIS TYPE, THE COURT FINDS BY A

1 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT IS SUFFERING FROM
2 A MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT THAT RENDERS HIM INCOMPETENT TO THE
3 EXTENT THAT HE CAN'T UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
4 THE PROCEEDINGS OR CANNOT ASSIST PROPERLY IN HIS DEFENSE, THE
5 COURT SHALL COMMIT THE DEFENDANT TO THE CUSTODY OF THE
6 ATTORNEY GENERAL.

7 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THEN SHOULD HOSPITALIZE THE
8 DEFENDANT FOR TREATMENT IN A SUITABLE FACILITY FOR A
9 REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, NOT TO EXCEED FOUR MONTHS, AS IS
10 NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE'S A SUBSTANTIAL
11 PROBABILITY THAT IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THE DEFENDANT WILL
12 ATTAIN THE CAPACITY TO PERMIT THE PROCEEDINGS TO GO FORWARD.

13 THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE THAT CONTROLS IN THIS
14 CASE IS MANDATORY AND THERE'S NO DISCRETION HERE.

15 THE COURT, THEREFORE, ORDERS THAT THE DEFENDANT BE
16 COMMITTED TO THE CUSTODY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR A PERIOD
17 OF FOUR MONTHS OR FOR SUCH SHORTER PERIOD OF TIME IN WHICH A
18 DETERMINATION MAY BE MADE ABOUT WHETHER HE CAN ATTAIN MENTAL
19 COMPETENCY SO THAT THESE PROCEEDINGS CAN GO FORWARD IN THE
20 FUTURE.

21 THE COURT SETS THE HEARING DATE FOR THAT
22 DETERMINATION AT THIS TIME AS SEPTEMBER 21ST. I'LL SET THAT
23 AT 10:00 ON THE 21ST OF SEPTEMBER IN THIS COURT.

24 THE COURT ORDERS FURTHER THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
25 OR ITS DESIGNATE SHALL PREPARE A REPORT INFORMING THE COURT ON

1 THE ISSUE OF THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE DEFENDANT WILL REGAIN
2 COMPETENCY OR CAN BE RESTORED TO COMPETENCY SUCH THAT THE
3 PROCEEDINGS SHALL GO FORWARD.

4 THE REPORT SHALL BE FILED WITH THE COURT NO LATER
5 THAN AUGUST 31ST. UPON RECEIPT OF THE REPORT, I WILL, OF
6 COURSE, PROVIDE COUNSEL FOR BOTH PARTIES WITH COPIES OF THE
7 REPORT.

8 ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING MY FINDING ON COMPETENCY
9 FROM THE DEFENSE?

10 MS. CLARKE: NO, YOUR HONOR.

11 THE COURT: FROM THE GOVERNMENT?

12 MR. KLEINDIENST: NO, SIR.

13 THE COURT: THE LAST ISSUE, AS I SAID GOING INTO
14 THIS, IS I GOT SOME LETTERS DECLARING SOME CONFLICT WITH HIS
15 COUNSEL.

16 THE COURT FINDS THAT MR. LOUGHNER IS NOT COMPETENT
17 AT THIS POINT. AND I THINK, FRANKLY, THOSE COMPLAINTS IN
18 THOSE LETTERS ARE A SYMPTOM OF WHAT THE DOCTORS FOUND, AND I
19 INTEND TO TABLE THEM AT THIS TIME. AT SUCH POINT THAT HIS
20 COMPETENCY IS RESTORED, IF HE WANTS TO BRING UP THE MATTER OF
21 COUNSEL, HE CAN RENEW IT THEN.

22 MS. CLARKE: YES, YOUR HONOR.

23 THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE FROM EITHER COUNSEL?

24 MS. CLARKE: JUST ONE MOMENT.

25 MR. KLEINDIENST: NOTHING FROM THE GOVERNMENT, YOUR

1 HONOR. THANK YOU.

2 (PAUSE IN PROCEEDINGS)

3 MS. CLARKE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

4 THE COURT: WE'RE IN RECESS.

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7
8 I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE TESTIMONY
9 ADDUCED IN THE FOREGOING MATTER IS
10 A TRUE RECORD OF SAID PROCEEDINGS.

11
12 S/EVA OEMICK 6-7-2011

13 EVA OEMICK DATE

14 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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